De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399100 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Colin Howson (London School of Economics and Political Science, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2008 |
| Volumen | 59 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 1-23 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2008-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axm042 |
| OpenAlex | W2105492369 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 12 |
| Referencias citadas | 21 |
Many people believe that there is a Dutch Book argument establishing that the principle of countable additivity is a condition of coherence. De Finetti himself did not, but for reasons that are at first sight perplexing. I show that he rejected countable additivity, and hence the Dutch Book argument for it, because countable additivity conflicted with intuitive principles about the scope of authentic consistency constraints. These he often claimed were logical in nature, but he never attempted to relate this idea to deductive logic and its own concept of consistency. This I do, showing that at one level the definitions of deductive and probabilistic consistency are identical, differing only in the nature of the constraints imposed. In the probabilistic case I believe that R.T. Cox's ‘scale-free’ axioms for subjective probability are the most suitable candidates. 1. Introduction2. Coherence and Consistency3. The Infinite Fair Lottery4. The Puzzle Resolved—But Replaced by Another5. Countable Additivity, Conglomerability and Dutch Books6. The Probability Axioms and Cox's Theorem7. Truth and Probability8. Conclusion: ‘Logical Omniscience’
Additive function · Argument (complex analysis) · Axiom · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Consistency (knowledge bases) · Countable set · Discrete mathematics · Mathematical economics · Probabilistic logic · Statistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Is science inconsistent
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Accuracy and Coherence
Hypothetical Frequencies as Approximations
E.T. Jaynes’s Solution to the Problem of Countable Additivity
Coherence in Science
The qualitative paradox of non-conglomerability
Modelling uncertain inference
The strength of de Finetti’s coherence theorem
Hume’s Theorem
A Structural Justification of Probabilism
Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas
Mathematical methods of statistics
Bayes or bust?
Pragmatics and Empiricism
Betting on Theories
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry
Probability and the Weighing of Evidence
Physical probability and Bayesian statistics
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
A Conflict between Finite Additivity and Avoiding Dutch Book
Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability
| Obras citantes distintas | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,71 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2009 - 2024 (16) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 11 |