A Limited Defense of the Pessimistic Induction
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399261 |
|---|---|
| Autores | JESSE HOBBS (University of Mississippi, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1994 |
| Volumen | 45 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 171-191 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1994-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/45.1.171 |
| OpenAlex | W2113951393 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 7 |
The inductive argument from the falsity of most past scientific theories (more than 100 years old) to the falsity of most present ones is defensible, I argue, if it is modified to account for the degrees of theoreticity or observationality in such theories, and the extent to which they are hedged. The case of descriptive astronomy is examined to show that most of the true theories of the 1890s were high in observationality and/or significantly hedged. The false theories of that period, however, were not even approximately true. Apparently, scientists are more interested in supplanting theories with improved observations than in producing true theories.
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Falsity · Pessimism · History of Science and Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,11 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1999 - 2025 (27) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |