Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8399283
AutoresJeffrey Dunn (0000-0002-2521-2849, University of Massachusetts Amherst, autor de correspondencia)
Año2011
Volumen62
Número1
Páginas71-98
Fecha de publicación2011-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axq012
OpenAlexW2008906550
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas17

David Lewis ([1986b]) gives an attractive and familiar account of counterfactual dependence in the standard context. This account has recently been subject to a counterexample from Adam Elga ([2000]). In this article, I formulate a Lewisian response to Elga’s counterexample. The strategy is to add an extra criterion to Lewis’s similarity metric, which determines the comparative similarity of worlds. This extra criterion instructs us to take special science laws into consideration as well as fundamental laws. I argue that the Second Law of Thermodynamics should be seen as a special science law, and give a brief account of what Lewisian special science laws should look like. If successful, this proposal blocks Elga’s counterexample. 1 Introduction 2 The Asymmetry of Miracles and Overdetermination 3 Elga’s Counterexample 4 Possible Solutions 5 Structure of the Special Science Solution 6 The Special Science Solution 6.1 Thermodynamics as a Special Science 6.2 Lewisian Special Science Laws 7 Objections 8 Conclusion

Combinatorics · Context (archaeology) · Counterexample · Counterfactual thinking · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Metric (unit) · Philosophy of science · Physics · Second law of thermodynamics · Similarity (geometry) · Thermodynamics · Computer Science · Mathematics · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life