Classical Mechanics Is Lagrangian; It Is Not Hamiltonian
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399301 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Erik Curiel (0000-0002-5812-3033, Western University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2014 |
| Volumen | 65 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 269-321 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2014-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axs034 |
| OpenAlex | W2120229085 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 40 |
| Referencias citadas | 15 |
One can (for the most part) formulate a model of a classical system in either the Lagrangian or the Hamiltonian framework. Though it is often thought that those two formulations are equivalent in all important ways, this is not true: the underlying geometrical structures one uses to formulate each theory are not isomorphic. This raises the question of whether one of the two is a more natural framework for the representation of classical systems. In the event, the answer is yes: I state and sketch proofs of two technical results—inspired by simple physical arguments about the generic properties of classical systems—to the effect that, in a precise sense, classical systems evince exactly the geometric structure Lagrangian mechanics provides for the representation of systems, and none provided by Hamiltonian. The argument not only clarifies the conceptual structure of the two systems of mechanics, but also their relations to each other and their respective mechanisms for representing physical systems. It also shows why naïvely structural approaches to the representational content of physical theories cannot work. [Lagrange] grasped that he had gained a method of stating dynamical truths in a way, which is perfectly indifferent to the particular methods of measurement employed in fixing the positions of the various parts of the system. Accordingly, he went on to deduce equations of motion, which are equally applicable whatever quantitative measurements have been made, provided that they are adequate to fix positions. The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of all things. (Whitehead [1948], p. 63) 1. Introduction 2. Abstract Classical Systems 3. The Possible Interactions of a Classical System and the Structure of Its Space of States 4. Classical Systems Are Lagrangian 5. Classical Systems Are Not Hamiltonian 6. How Lagrangian and Hamiltonian Mechanics Represent Classical Systems 7. The Conceptual Structure of Classical Mechanics
Algorithm · Analytical dynamics · Analytical mechanics · Classical mechanics · Epistemology · Geometry · Hamiltonian mechanics · Hamiltonian system · Mathematical analysis · Mathematical proof · Phase space · Physical system · Physics · Representation (politics) · Simple (philosophy) · Simplicity · Sketch · Mathematics · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Relativity and Gravitational Theory
Quantum systems as indivisible stochastic processes
Equivalent Theories and Ontological Commitment
Theoretical equivalence in classical mechanics and its relationship to duality
The Logic in Philosophy of Science
What a Powers-BSA Theorist Should Say About Symmetries
On Privileged Coordinates and Kleinian Methods
Physical Theories are Prescriptions, not Descriptions
Hamiltonian Privilege
On Putnam’s Proof of the Impossibility of a Nominalistic Physics
Notation, Redundancy and Fundamental Logical Structure
What theoretical equivalence could not be
How to count structure
Hamiltonian mechanics is conservation of information entropy
On Einstein algebras and relativistic spacetimes
Change in Hamiltonian general relativity from the lack of a time-like Killing vector field
Spacetime structure
Quine’s conjecture on many-sorted logic
Identity conditions, idealisations and isomorphisms
The strong arm of the law
An invitation to conventionalism
Theoretical equivalence and duality
Fiber bundles, Yang–Mills theory, and general relativity
What are empirical consequences? On dispensability and composite objects
Deformation quantization as an appropriate guide to ontic structure
Structuralism with and without causation
Framework confirmation by Newtonian abduction
Mutual translatability, equivalence, and the structure of theories
The ontology of quantum field theory
No-go theorems
What Do Symmetries Tell Us about Structure
Structure and Equivalence
Scientific Representation and Theoretical Equivalence
Understanding and Equivalent Reformulations
A New Role for Mathematics in Empirical Sciences
Quantization as a Guide to Ontic Structure
On the Structure of Classical Mechanics
On the Existence of Spacetime Structure
Categorical Equivalence and the Kinematics-Dynamics Distinction
Equivalent and Inequivalent Formulations of Classical Mechanics
Part 2
A Primer on Determinism
Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica
The “Structure” of Physics
Symmetries and the explanation of conservation laws in the light of the inverse problem in Lagrangian mechanics
On the nature of the conjunction fallacy
Metaphysical underdetermination
The Dome
Norton's Slippery Slope
Science and the Modern World
The Scientific Image
| Obras citantes distintas | 40 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3,33 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 37 |