Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399515 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Tomoji Shogenji (0000-0001-8859-3960, Providence College, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2000 |
| Volumen | 51 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 287-298 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2000-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/51.2.287 |
| OpenAlex | W2035009441 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
| Referencias citadas | 8 |
This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justification are not truly circular but are instances of ordinary Bayesian confirmation, and hence they can raise the probability of the hypothesis as legitimately as any such confirmation does. I shall argue in particular that despite its dependence on perception we can use naturalized epistemology to confirm the reliability of a perceptual process without circularity.
Epistemology · Perception · Process (computing) · Reliability (semiconductor) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,25 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 5 |