Notions of Cause
Russell's thesis revisited
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399762 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Don Ro (0000-0003-1813-3111, University of Alabama at Birmingham), Don Ross, David Spurrett (0000-0003-2542-358X, University of Alabama at Birmingham) |
| Año | 2007 |
| Volumen | 58 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 45-76 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2007-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axl027 |
| OpenAlex | W2144653990 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 6 |
| Referencias citadas | 30 |
We discuss Russell's 1913 essay arguing for the irrelevance of the idea of causation to science and its elimination from metaphysics as a precursor to contemporary philosophical naturalism. We show how Russell's application raises issues now receiving much attention in debates about the adequacy of such naturalism, in particular, problems related to the relationship between folk and scientific conceptual influences on metaphysics, and to the unification of a scientifically inspired worldview. In showing how to recover an approximation to Russell's conclusion while explaining scientists' continuing appeal to causal ideas (without violating naturalism by philosophically correcting scientists) we illustrate a general naturalist strategy for handling problems around the unification of sciences that assume different levels of naïveté with respect to folk conceptual frameworks. We do this despite rejecting one of the premises of Russell's argument, a version of reductionism that was scientifically plausible in 1913 but is not so now. 1Russell's Naturalistic Rejection of Causation2Psychology, Folk Notions and Intuitions3Causes in Science4Letting Science Hold Trumps
Appeal · Argument (complex analysis) · Causation · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Philosophy of science · Political science · Reductionism · Scientific theory · Unification · Chemistry · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
Structural Realism and the Relationship between the Special Sciences and Physics
Agency, Causation, and Empiricism
How to semanticize science and sell it short
Are causal facts really explanatorily emergent? Ladyman and Ross on higher-level causal facts and renormalization group explanation
Physical Causation and Difference-Making
Physics and Causation
Dictionary of philosophy and psychology
Reconsidering Logical Positivism
Mind in a Physical World
Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
The Devil in the Details
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning
Real Patterns
A Theory of Causal Learning in Children
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
The Dappled World
Mind and World
Every Thing Must Go
Scientific Explanation
The logic of social exchange
A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Waste—Critical Notice
Remodelling Structural Realism
What is structural realism
Explanatory Unification
Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory
What's Really Wrong with Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality
On the Notion of Cause [1913]
The scientific image
The Empirical Stance
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,33 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2008 - 2021 (14) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 5 |