Illegal Market Governance and Organized Crime Groups’ Resilience

A Study of The Sinaloa Cartel

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8400548
AutoresValentin Pereda (0000-0002-3336-1748, International Centre for Comparative Criminology, autor de correspondencia), David Décary-Hétu (0000-0002-4360-140X, International Centre for Comparative Criminology)
Año2024
Volumen64
Número2
Páginas326-342
Fecha de publicación2024-02-15
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal of Criminology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0955 • E-ISSN: 1464-3529
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjc/azad027
OpenAlexW4382240986
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas23

Since its emergence in the early 1990s, the Sinaloa Cartel has effectively surmounted all challenges to its existence, while, simultaneously, successfully developing its illegal ventures in Mexico and beyond. Based on evidence from the accounts of witnesses who testified in the prosecution of Joaquin Guzmán Loera (also known as El Chapo), one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s most prominent figures, we argue that this OCG’s resilience partially derives from the illegal governance practices it has implemented in the criminal markets in which it operates. In particular, we contend that the Sinaloa Cartel’s reliance on four types of illegal governance have been pivotal in promoting its capacity to weather adversity, namely: (1) judicial, (2) financial, (3) political and (4) regulatory governance

Business · Cartel · Corporate governance · Economics · Industrial organization · Organised crime · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Psychological resilience · Resilience (materials science) · Terrorism · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Finance · Law · Psychology · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses