Prosecutorial Independence and the Democratic Requirement of Accountability in Italy

Analysis of a Deviant Case in a Comparative Perspective

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8401434
AutoresG D FEDERICO, Giuseppe Di Federico (University of Bologna, autor de correspondencia)
Año1998
Volumen38
Número3
Páginas371-387
Fecha de publicación1998-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal of Criminology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0955 • E-ISSN: 1464-3529
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a014253
OpenAlexW2044219113
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas2

This article deals with the role of public prosecution and the necessity of combining at the operational level two functional needs that are difficult to reconcile: (a) to ensure prosecutoriai independence; (b) to ensure that prosecutorial discretion be subject to the democratic principle of accountability. While a trend to redress the balance in favour of prosecutorial independence seems to be gaining momentum in several countries, the author uses the Italian case to demonstrate that the need for prosecutorial accountability be protected. In particular he shows that Italy by ignoring the need to render prosecutorial discretion accountable has de facto delegated to a totally independent prosecutor the definition of a good part of its criminal policy. The manifold dysfunctional consequences for the efficient control of crime and for the effective and equal protection of civil rights are outlined

Accountability · Democracy · Discretion · Independence (probability theory) · Language change · Law and economics · Political science · Redress · Sociology · European Criminal Justice and Data Protection · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems