Creating better boards through codification

Possibilities and limitations in UK corporate governance, 1992–2010

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8419367
AutoresDonald Nordberg (0000-0003-0857-7106, City, University of London, autor de correspondencia), Terry McNulty (University of Liverpool)
Año2013
Volumen55
Número3
Páginas348-374
Fecha de publicación2013-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaBusiness History (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-6791 • E-ISSN: 1743-7938
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00076791.2012.712964
OpenAlexW2074832312
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas74

Since the beginnings of the global debate over corporate governance in the early 1990s, academics, practitioners and policymakers have focused on changing boards of directors to improve corporate governance. The financial crisis of 2007–09 arose despite two decades of codification of corporation governance, a process that continues in the light of concern about corporate performance and accountability: codes have not eliminated the problems they set out to address. Analysing the three main versions of the UK code of corporate governance, we see a shifting discourse of ‘structures’ in Cadbury to ‘independence’ under the reforms in 2003, and then in the 2010 iteration towards ‘behaviour’, as the code seeks to improve boards as mechanisms of corporate governance. The evolution in the language and recommendations of the code reveals growing understanding both of the practical challenge of board effectiveness and of the limitations to codification

Accountability · Business · Code (set theory · Corporate governance · Corporate law · Corporation · Independence (probability theory · Political science · Process (computing · Public relations · Set (abstract data type · Accounting · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corporate Governance and Law · Corporate Insolvency and Governance · Finance · Law