Why misinformation must not be ignored

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8711368
AutoresUllrich K H Ecker (0000-0003-4743-313X, autor de correspondencia), Li Qian Tay (0000-0001-7990-0455), Jon Roozenbeek (0000-0002-8150-9305), Sander Van Der Linden (0000-0002-0269-1744), John Cook (0000-0002-3330-5180), Naomi Oreskes (0000-0001-6122-9843), Lewandowsky (0000-0003-1655-2013), Stephan Lewandowsky
Año2024
Volumen80
Número6
Páginas867-878
Fecha de publicación2024-12-12
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Psychologist (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-066X • E-ISSN: 1935-990X
EditorialAmerican Psychological Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1037/amp0001448
PMID39666498
OpenAlexW4405320086
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8

Recent academic debate has seen the emergence of the claim that misinformation is not a significant societal problem. We argue that the arguments used to support this minimizing position are flawed, particularly if interpreted (e.g., by policymakers or the public) as suggesting that misinformation can be safely ignored. Here, we rebut the two main claims, namely that misinformation is not of substantive concern (a) due to its low incidence and (b) because it has no causal influence on notable political or behavioral outcomes. Through a critical review of the current literature, we demonstrate that (a) the prevalence of misinformation is nonnegligible if reasonably inclusive definitions are applied and that (b) misinformation has causal impacts on important beliefs and behaviors. Both scholars and policymakers should therefore continue to take misinformation seriously. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)

Internet privacy · Law and economics · MEDLINE · Misinformation · Political science · Politics · PsycINFO · Public relations · Sociology · Computer Science · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Psychology · Law · Social Psychology