Why theory is not myth
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8975637 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jon Mills (0000-0003-3673-0884, Gordon F. Derner School of Psychology Adelphi University New York USA, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2020 |
| Volumen | 50 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 435-438 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020-11-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jtsb.12262 |
| OpenAlex | W3112814347 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 4 |
James Cresswell provides a thoughtful critique of my essay on a theory of myth (Mills) with a specific focus on the nature of theorizing that challenges the dogma of empirical frames of reference, concluding that scientific theories themselves are contemporary myths. Insofar as myth is an attempt to provide a narrative or discourse about phenomena, Cresswell's argument could apply to any theory. But he takes this point further: theory is synonymous with myth. In order to unpack this evocative claim, it may prove useful to revisit how theory and myth relate to the concepts of logos, truth, ontology and identity. In the end, I suggest theory is not myth because theory sets out to describe, interpret and explain phenomena and is scrutinized for its validity, generalizability and applied consequences, while the premises of myth are often historically and culturally presupposed or simply devolve into belief that may or may not be defensible
Aesthetics · Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Generalizability theory · Identity (music · Linguistics · Logos Bible Software · Mythology · Narrative · Sociology · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Representations and Identity
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |