Experimental Psychology and Duhem's Problem
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8975725 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Sam S Rakover (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2003 |
| Volumen | 33 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 45-66 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2003-03-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-5914.00205 |
| OpenAlex | W2077693019 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 16 |
Sam S. Rakover, Experimental Psychology and Duhem's Problem, pp. 45–66. The paper proposes a practical answer to Duhem's problem within the framework of experimental psychology. First, this problem is briefly discussed; second, two studies in psychology are presented illustrating how theories are tested. Thirdly, based on the foregoing, an approach called the “Empirical Reasoning” (ER) is developed and justified. It is shown that the ER approach can successfully cope with Duhem's problem. Finally, the ER approach and the Error Statistics approach of Mayo are critically compared with regard to Duhem's problem
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| Citas por año | 1 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Altamente citado | No |