Intentions, Trust and Frames
A Note on Sociality and the Theory of Games
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9256928 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Vittorio Pelligra (0000-0002-8012-4243, University of Cagliari, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2011 |
| Volumen | 69 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 163-188 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2011-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Review of Social Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0034-6764 • E-ISSN: 1470-1162 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00346760903568451 |
| OpenAlex | W2023745578 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 52 |
Psychological Game Theory (PGT) expands classical game theory allowing for the formal analysis of belief-dependent sentiments and emotions such as resentment, pride, shame, gratefulness and the like. PGT incorporates these factors by relating agents' subjective expected utility to players' strategies, to their beliefs about others' strategies, and also to their beliefs about others' beliefs about their strategies, and so on. This paper argues that, thanks to the epistemic implications of this hierarchy of beliefs, PGT is well-endowed to address, and to some extent solve, three of the most challenging problems recently emerged in classical game theory related respectively to the role of players' intentionality, to the self-fulfilling nature of trust and finally to the so-called social framing effects
Epistemology · Framing (construction) · Game theory · Intentionality · Political science · Pride · Resentment · Shame · Sociality · Sociology · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
Selfishness, altruism and rationality
Modeling Rational Agents
The Theory of the Individual in Economics
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust and Trustworthiness among Ceos
Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading
Non-Cooperative Games
When Social Outcomes Aren′t Fair
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
A theory of reciprocity
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Equilibrium points in n -person games
Psychological games and sequential rationality
Guilt in Games
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
Crime and Social Interactions
On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Sequential Equilibria
Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
Theories of Theories of Mind
Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele
The emergence of a shared action ontology
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Beyond Individual Choice
The Commonsense of Political Economy
The Social Multiplier
The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition
The Name of the Game
Intention and Personal Policies
A Theory of Focal Points
Ken Binmore’s Evolutionary Social Theory
The “false consensus effect”
The Folk Concept of Intentionality
Game theory and the social contract
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Neuroeconomics
In Honor of Matthew Rabin
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,33 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2014 - 2017 (4) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |