Defining the frontiers of the firm through property rights allocation

The case of the French retailer cooperative Leclerc

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9257008
AutoresMarie-Laure Baron (0000-0003-4384-6631, Université Le Havre Normandie, autor de correspondencia)
Año2007
Volumen65
Número3
Páginas293-317
Fecha de publicación2007-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaReview of Social Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0034-6764 • E-ISSN: 1470-1162
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00346760701635825
OpenAlexW2127169992
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas18

France harbours three large retailer cooperatives which, put together, account for more than a third of the national market share. The largest of these is Leclerc, a leading firm on the French territory. The paper presented here shows how, through the particular distribution of property rights and decision patterns, this cooperative, although hampered by an unstable size, manages to compete with integrated firms. Indeed, the processes that have been developed enable the cooperative to acquire long-term property rights on the specific assets (stores), while remaining in the cooperative framework. The system built is efficient because incentives remain high for members to increase their own performance

Business · Economics · Epistemology · Industrial organization · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Property (philosophy) · Property rights · Cooperative Studies and Economics · Philosophy