Aristotle, Menaechmus, and Circular Proof

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9664851
AutoresJonathan Barnes (0000-0001-6311-1435, Thiel College, autor de correspondencia)
Año1976
Volumen26
Número2
Páginas278-292
Fecha de publicación1976-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Classical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0009-8388 • E-ISSN: 1471-6844
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0009838800033152
OpenAlexW2097830480
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas18
Referencias citadas29

(a) The Regress : Knowledge, we like to suppose, is essentially a rational thing: if I claim to know something, I must be prepared to back up my claim by statingmy reasons for making it;and if my claim is to be upheld, my reasons must begood reasons. Now suppose I know that Q; and let my reasons be conjunctively contained in the proposition that R. Clearly, I must believe that R (for R cannot give my reasons unless it has my assent);equally clearly, I must know that R (for mere opinion is not nutritious enough to sustain the demanding body of knowledge). Thus if I know that Q, I know that R. But if I know that R, then I must have my reasons, R' for holding R; and, by the same argument, I mustknow that R'. And if R', then R”; and so on, ad infinitum

Argument (complex analysis · Common knowledge (logic · Epistemology · Need to know · Political science · Proposition · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy