Cicero

Reviewed by: Cicero: On Life and Death trans. by John Davie David Robertson John Davie (tr.). Cicero: On Life and Death. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xxviii, 251. $16.95 (pb.). ISBN 978-0-19-964414-8. With an Introduction and Notes by Miriam T. Griffin. The surge in new translations of Cicero’s philosophical works in recent years continues with this contribution, which contains On Old Age, On Friendship, and Books 1, 2, and 5 of the Tusculan Disputations. There are translations of the prefaces only of Books 3 and 4, although the author provides a full synopsis of both of these books. Fortunately, Margaret Graver has provided a fine recent translation of books 3 and 4 with commentary.1 In addition, Davie includes translations of two of Cicero’s letters to his friends (Ep. ad Fam. 11.27; 11.28) in an appendix that supplements the treatise on friendship. Finally, there is a select bibliography and explanatory notes for all the translations included in the volume. Overall, the translations are of high quality, and the volume is a valuable addition to the series. There are, however, a few passages that involve some difficulties. One of these occurs at Tusc. 5.53.2 Davie translates Cicero’s argument for virtue as the basis for the happy life as follows (92): “And if virtue provides sufficient guarantee for living well, it also provides sufficient for living happily. Virtue certainly provides sufficient for living bravely, and if bravely, also with [End Page 744] great spirit, and indeed so that we are never frightened by anything, and are for ever undefeated. It follows that nothing causes regret, nothing is lacking, nothing stands in our way. Accordingly, everything is equable, complete, successful, and therefore happy. But virtue provides sufficient for us to live bravely, and so sufficient for us also to live happily.” First, I would question the preference of Davie to translate satis ... praesidii as “sufficient guarantee” (cf. Tusc. 5.2; 5.12; 5.83). Rather, a better choice here might be “sufficient bulwark” or “sufficient stronghold.” The notion of a guarantee or security would be more suitable in connection with other Latin terms that Cicero employs elsewhere, such as fides. Second, there is the awkward English of the occurrences in Tusc. 5.53 of “virtue provides sufficient.” For example, this is what Davie prefers in the second sentence of this passage: “Virtue certainly provides sufficient for living bravely” (satis est enim certe in virtute ut fortiter vivamus). Perhaps one should adopt a rendering such as “virtue is sufficient” or “virtue is adequate.” However, this approach fails to capture the openness in Cicero’s Latin as to whether he means sufficiency pure and simple or sufficiency of a certain kind (for instance, sufficient in potency). Perhaps Cicero would not recognize a significant difference between these two alternatives; however, elsewhere in the Tusculans (2.2), when he considers the fortitude that the soul might enjoy by resisting the fear of death, he clearly departs from the “bare sufficiency” of such fortitude in his use of praesidium as a kind of force to obtain the happy life (magnum ... praesidium ad beatam vitam). There seems to be a range of possibilities that pertain to Ciceronian expressions of sufficiency or potency. In any case, there are difficult choices here that any translator must face—as always, smoother English tends to obscure the nuances of the Latin. This volume will further expand the accessibility of Cicero’s philosophy for today’s reader. This is fortunate, for there are only a handful of works, ancient and modern, that present philosophical themes to a wide audience as well as these treatises. It is fitting, then, that a highly distinguished figure in Cicero studies, Miriam T. Griffin, provides the introduction and notes for this volume, for her work has shed much light on Cicero’s philosophy for the benefit of a contemporary readership. Her recent departure from an abundant life of scholarship lends a valedictory dimension to the introduction, which lucidly sketches the turbulent politics of Cicero’s time. The political factors are, of course, extremely important for understanding the darker moments of the Tusculans

Argument (complex analysis) · Art · Cicero · Friendship · Griffin · Literature · Social science · Sociology · Theology · Virtue · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Classics · History · Law in Society and Culture · Philosophy