Analyzing the Wrongfulness of Lying

A Defence of Pluralism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9687293
AutoresARIANNA FALBO (0000-0001-9280-1945, John Brown University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen56
Número3
Páginas431-454
Fecha de publicación2017-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217317000579
OpenAlexW2769685484
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas26

Extant accounts, both old and new, of the wrongfulness of lying are all inadequate. The common problem with each consists in its unitary structure. Such analyses presuppose that all lies are wrongful in the same way, for the same unifying reason. This assumption, however, does not do justice to the phenomena of lying. This is because lying can be morally objectionable in diverse ways. Thus, I argue for a dialectical shift towards a pluralist approach to the wrongfulness of lying. We should not force unity upon the moral structure of lying when there is actually diversity

Biology · Dialectic · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Extant taxon · Lying · Pluralism (philosophy) · Political science · Sociology · Unitary state · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment