A Reconstruction of Korsgaard on Autonomy’s Objective Value in Light of Sangiovanni, Guyer, and Langton

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9689552
AutoresEkin Erkan (0000-0001-7888-4449, University of Cincinnati, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Páginas1-21
Fecha de publicación2025-09-04
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217325100772
OpenAlexW4414000716
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas33

Christine Korsgaard avers that the value we place on specific personal choices — understood as goals or ends — involves committing to them, or forming a care, which is itself conditioned by the value-conferring ability of the valuer. In other words, personal autonomy implies the objective value of the agent’s autonomous choosing and their coeval cares projects. Commentators like Andrea Sangiovanni, Paul Guyer, and Rae Langton criticize Korsgaard’s commitment-based conception of autonomous choosing. This article reviews these objections and then proposes a modified Korsgaardian framework concerning the objective value of autonomous choosing, which, I propose, avoids these critical objections

Aesthetics · Autonomy · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology