Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9703019
AutoresCamille Cornand (0000-0003-0364-6184, CNRS‐BETA University of Strasbourg), Frank Heinemann (Technische Universität Berlin), Frank W Heinemann (0000-0002-9007-8404, Technische Universität Berlin)
Año2008
Volumen118
Número528
Páginas718-742
Fecha de publicación2008-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02139.x
OpenAlexW2123907200
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas28

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare: public announcements serve as focal points for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that reducing public signals' precision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare. This article shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision but, under certain conditions, not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s)

Affect (linguistics · Business · Computer security · Economics · Externality · Market economy · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Political science · Private information retrieval · Public disclosure · Public economics · Public information · Public relations · Publicity · Transparency (behavior · Welfare · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Engineering · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Marketing · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact · Psychology