The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market
A Note
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9704023 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Bin Xu (0000-0002-0947-2237, University of Florida, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2000 |
| Volumen | 110 |
| Número | 463 |
| Páginas | 576-580 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2000-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00538 |
| OpenAlex | W2059486917 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 2 |
Hillier and Worrall (1994) derived a surprising result that credit should be further rationed in the costly‐monitoring credit‐rationing equilibrium. This note shows that their result may be reversed if monitoring costs are endogenously determined
Bond market · Credit rationing · Economics · Interest rate · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Rationing · Welfare · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Housing Market and Economics · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |