Alternative Time Patterns of Decisions and Dynamic Strategic Interactions
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9705050 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Pierre Cahuc (0000-0003-1848-2426, Université Paris‐Panthéon‐Sorbonne), Hubert Kempf (0000-0003-2707-9655, Université Paris‐Panthéon‐Sorbonne) |
| Año | 1997 |
| Volumen | 107 |
| Número | 445 |
| Páginas | 1728-1741 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1997-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00077.x |
| OpenAlex | W2029979456 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 21 |
This paper offers a simple approach to study steady‐state Markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players (are obliged to) commit their actions for several periods. It highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in such games. The obtained results are then applied to various, either micro‐or macroeconomic, issues where time patterns of decisions matter
Commit · Economics · Game theory · Markov chain · Markov perfect equilibrium · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Sequential game · Simple (philosophy · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Policy · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,07 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1998 - 2004 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |