Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9706946
AutoresAmy Finkelstein (0000-0002-9941-6684, MIT), James Poterba (MIT and NBER), James M Poterba (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Año2002
Volumen112
Número476
Páginas28-50
Fecha de publicación2002-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.0j672
OpenAlexW2001895530
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas12

This paper explores adverse selection in the voluntary and compulsory individual annuity markets in the United Kingdom. Two empirical regularities support standard models of adverse selection. First, annuitants are longer-lived than non-annuitants. These mortality differences are more pronounced in the voluntary than in the compulsory annuity market. We estimate that the amount of adverse selection in the compulsory market is about one half of that in the voluntary market. Second, the pricing of different types of annuity products within each annuity market is consistent with individuals selecting products based, in part, on private information about their mortality prospects. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002

Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Annuity · Business · Economics · Life annuity · Selection (genetic algorithm · Turnover · Finance · Global Health Care Issues · Healthcare Policy and Management · Insurance, Mortality, Demography, Risk Management