A Generalised Model of Monopsony

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9707438
AutoresAlan Manning (0000-0002-7884-3580, London School of Economics and Political Science, autor de correspondencia)
Año2006
Volumen116
Número508
Páginas84-100
Fecha de publicación2006-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01048.x
OpenAlexW2163655788
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12
Referencias citadas15

This article presents a general but very simple model in which the supply of labour to an individual employer is not infinitely elastic but the employer can also raise employment by increasing expenditure on recruitment. Using this, it is shown how that division between perfect competition and monopsony is whether there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment. Using a unique British data set containing information on both labour turnover costs and the number of recruits we present estimates that do suggest that there is an increasing marginal cost of recruitment. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society

Economic history · Economics · Monopsony · Neoclassical economics · Economic theories and models · Firm Innovation and Growth · ICT Impact and Policies