Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9710294
AutoresHuailu Li (0000-0002-7039-7256, Fudan University), Kevin Lang (0000-0002-8497-1706, Boston University and NBER), Kaiwen Leong (Nanyang Technological University)
Año2018
Volumen128
Número611
Páginas1570-1608
Fecha de publicación2018-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12476
OpenAlexW2132124509
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas18

The street sex worker market in Geylang, Singapore is a highly competitive market in which clients can search legally at negligible cost, making it ideal for testing Diamond's hypothesis regarding search and monopoly pricing. As Diamond predicts, price discrimination survives in this market. Despite an excess supply of workers, but consistent with their self‐reported attitudes and beliefs, sex workers charge whites (Bangladeshis) more (less), based on perceived willingness to pay, and are more (less) likely to approach and reach an agreement with them. Consistent with taste discrimination, they avoid Indians, charge more and reach an agreement with them less frequently

Business · Charge (physics · Competition (biology · Demographic economics · Diamond · Economics · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Price discrimination · Taste · Willingness to pay · African Sexualities and LGBTQ+ Issues · Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research · Psychology · Sex work and related issues