One Dollar, One Vote
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9710461 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Loukas Karabarbounis (University of Chicago, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2011 |
| Volumen | 121 |
| Número | 553 |
| Páginas | 621-651 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2011-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02406.x |
| OpenAlex | W1596143350 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 19 |
| Referencias citadas | 51 |
This article revisits the relationship between inequality and redistribution in a panel of advanced OECD countries. Using panel data methods that hold constant a variety of determinants of redis-tributive spending, I find a non-monotonic relationship between pre-tax-and-transfer distribution of income and redistribution. Relative to mean income, a more affluent rich and middle class are associated with less redistribution and a richer poor class is associated with more redistribution. These results are consistent with a one dollar, one vote politico-economic equilibrium: when the income of a group of citizens increases, aggregate redistributive policies tilt towards this group’s most preferred policies. What determines the amount of resources that societies redistribute between their members? The current consensus in the literature, summarised in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004), is that the pre-tax-and-transfer distribution of income is not a significant determinant of redistribution. The striking contrast between the US and Europe illustrates this ‘paradox of redistribution’. The two workhorse models of distribution and redistribution, the normative model of Mirrlees (1971) and the positive theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981), in general predict that
Demographic economics · Econometrics · Economic inequality · Economics · Income distribution · Inequality · Labour economics · Liberian dollar · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Monetary economics · Panel data · Political science · Politics · Redistribution (election · Redistribution of income and wealth · Transfer payment · Welfare · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Income, Poverty, and Inequality
Preferences for Redistribution
Preferences for redistribution and exposure to tax-benefit schemes in Europe
Markets for public decision-making
Preferences for redistribution in Japan
Income inequality, redistribution and the position of the decisive voter
Individuals’ socioeconomic position, inequality perceptions, and redistributive preferences in OECD countries
Class versus Identity
Understanding the Moderating Effect of Altruistic Behavior on Support for Social Insurance in India
The arithmetics and politics of domestic resource mobilization for poverty eradication
Relying on the private sector
Changes in Inequality and Generalized Trust in Europe
Inequality and Competition in State Redistributive Systems
Sustainable development goals and inclusive development
Quantity over Quality? Local Income Inequalities and Public Service Delivery in Brazil
Distribuição de investimentos públicos, infraestrutura urbana e desigualdade socioespacial em Curitiba
Polarization and cultural divergence
Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives
Education and Voting Conservative
Desigualdade de Renda e Demanda por Redistribuição Caminham Juntas na América Latina no Período 1997-2015
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Culture and Institutions
Ends against the middle
Fairness and Redistribution
Income Distribution and Macroeconomics
The Growth of Government
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax
Dynamic panel data models
Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics
Voting over income tax schedules
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data
Africa's Growth Tragedy
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution
Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe
Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities
Pressure groups and redistribution
Growth, income distribution, and democracy
The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution
Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of “Secondary” Data-Sets
Cross-National Differences in the Rise in Earnings Inequality
Inequality and Redistribution
New ways of looking at old issues
Does the median voter model explain the size of government
Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
What Limits Social Spending
The political Economy of Wealth and Interest
Wage-Setting Measures
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions
Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution
| Obras citantes distintas | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,12 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 19 |