Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences
Accountability Through Independence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9710618 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Anton Muscatelli (0000-0003-3001-0640, University of Glasgow, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1998 |
| Volumen | 108 |
| Número | 447 |
| Páginas | 529-542 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1998-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00302 |
| OpenAlex | W2095869560 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 11 |
| Referencias citadas | 7 |
This paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank's preferences are unknown. Two key conclusions emerge from the paper. First, even with optimal targets or contracts, central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society. Second, if the delegation solution is preferable, and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks, the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets, i.e. by making it goal-independent
Accountability · Central bank · Economics · Independence (probability theory · Inflation (cosmology · Inflation targeting · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political science · Economic theories and models · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
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| Obras citantes distintas | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,42 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2000 - 2015 (16) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 11 |