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An Alternative Solution to Rubinstein's Model of Sequential Bargaining Under Incomplete Information

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9712974
AutoresChristopher Harris (0009-0005-6850-8884, autor de correspondencia)
Año1985
Volumen95
Páginas102
Fecha de publicación1985-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2232874
OpenAlexW2044635216
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas1

Journal Article An Alternative Solution to Rubinstein's Model of Sequential Bargaining Under Incomplete Information Get access Christopher Harris Christopher Harris Nuffield College, Oxford. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 95, Issue Supplement, 1 December 1985, Pages 102–112, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232874 Published: 01 December 1985

Complete information · Economics · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Volume (thermodynamics · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

  • Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

    Ariel Rubinstein•Econometrica•1982

Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
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