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Independent Private Value Auctions

Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9714593
AutoresJohn H Kagel (0000-0002-6870-814X, University of Pittsburgh), Dan Levin (0000-0002-8274-6337, University of Houston)
Año1993
Volumen103
Número419
Páginas868
Fecha de publicación1993-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2234706
OpenAlexW2096423350
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12
Referencias citadas4

The symmetric equilibrium of third-price auctions is characterized. It makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second-price auctions: bids exceed private values, the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one, increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids, and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. In the experiment, bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory. However, the game theoretic models correctly anticipate, at least directionally, the important effects of the price rule changes. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society

Auction theory · Bid shading · Business · Common value auction · Economics · English auction · Generalized second-price auction · Microeconomics · Statistics · Unique bid auction · Value (mathematics · Vickrey auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics

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Obras citantes distintas12
Citas por año0,38
Intervalo de citas1994 - 2025 (32)
Velocidad de citaciónrecent
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 12
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