Limited commitment and crowding out of private transfers

Evidence from a randomised experiment

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9717185
AutoresPedro Albarran (0000-0002-2277-9719, CEMFI University College London, IFS, University of Chicago and NBER), Orazio P Attanasio (CEMFI University College London, IFS, University of Chicago and NBER), Orazio Attanasio (0000-0003-3693-4393, University College London)
Año2003
Volumen113
Número486
PáginasC77-C85
Fecha de publicación2003-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.00112
OpenAlexW2056127087
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17
Referencias citadas8

This paper studies some empirical implications of models with limited risk sharing due to the imperfect enforceability of contracts. We test whether the amount by which public transfers reduce private transfers is affected by features of the economy, such as the variance of income and its persistence. These implications are unique to models with imperfect enforceability. We use data from Mexico collected to evaluate a public transfer programme. It included a randomised component that we exploit as a source of exogenous variation. Our results support the theoretical model in that the crowding out of private transfers is larger in villages where the variance of income is smaller

Crowding out · Demographic economics · Econometrics · Economics · Empirical evidence · Exploit · Imperfect · Monetary economics · Public economics · Transfer (computing · Variance (accounting · Agricultural risk and resilience · Computer Science · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare