Changing Tastes and Effective Consistency

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9718013
AutoresLarry Selden (Columbia University), Xiao Wei (0000-0003-3534-8835, University of Pennsylvania)
Año2016
Volumen126
Número595
Páginas1912-1946
Fecha de publicación2016-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12312
OpenAlexW3124005751
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas38

In a single commodity setting with changing tastes, an individual’s consumption plan can be obtained using naïve or sophisticated choice. We provide two sufficient conditions for when the solutions are unique and agree and the common plan is representable by a non‐changing tastes utility. Because the solution is not revised over time, the plan and associated preferences are referred to as being effectively consistent. Afriat‐style revealed preference tests are derived. The assumption of effective consistency can mitigate the problems of vulnerability to Dutch Books, non‐existence of a competitive equilibrium and the aggregation of heterogeneous agents with changing tastes

Commodity · Consistency (knowledge bases · Consumption (sociology · Economics · Market economy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Plan (archaeology · Preference · Revealed preference · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Economic theories and models