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The Financial Power of the Powerless

Socio‐Economic Status and Interest Rates Under Partial Rule of Law

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9718427
AutoresTimur Kuran (0000-0002-3006-4983, Duke University), Jonah Rubin (0000-0002-3133-7947, Chapman University), Jared Rubin
Año2018
Volumen128
Número609
Páginas758-796
Fecha de publicación2018-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12389
OpenAlexW3121475506
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13
Referencias citadas2

In advanced economies interest rates vary inversely with the risk of default, which itself is negatively related to the borrower’s socio‐economic status. The former relationship depends on the impartiality of the law. Where the law is markedly biased in favour of certain groups, these groups will pay a surcharge for capital. Legal power, as measured by privileges before the law, thus undermines financial power, the capacity to borrow cheaply. Developing this argument, this article also tests it through judicial records from Ottoman Istanbul, 1602–1799. Three privileged Ottoman groups–men, Muslims and titled elites–all paid relatively high interest rates conditional on various loan characteristics

Capital (architecture · Economics · Geography · Ideal (ethics · Impartiality · Interest rate · Law and economics · Loan · Modernization theory · Political science · Power (physics · Rule of law · Usury · Finance · Islamic Finance and Banking Studies · Law

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Obras citantes distintas13
Citas por año1,86
Intervalo de citas2019 - 2026 (8)
Velocidad de citacióncurrent
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 13
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