Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9720340
AutoresJacob K Goeree (0000-0001-9876-3425, CREED, University of Amsterdam), Theo Offerman (0000-0002-3469-8334, CREED, University of Amsterdam)
Año2003
Volumen113
Número489
Páginas598-613
Fecha de publicación2003-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00142
OpenAlexW1987052672
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas28

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller s revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction

Bidding · Business · Common value auction · Economics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Private information retrieval · Revenue · Salient · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Finance · Mathematics