Why Do Firms Offer ‘Employment Protection’
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9720792 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Christopher A Pissarides (0000-0002-0695-058X, London School of Economics and Political Science, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Volumen | 77 |
| Número | 308 |
| Páginas | 613-636 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2010.00861.x |
| OpenAlex | W1513414505 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 28 |
This paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk‐averse and there are employment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises during employment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severance compensation and sometimes give notice before dismissal. Severance compensation smooths consumption during employment, and dismissal delays insure partially against the unemployment risk because of moral hazard. During the delay, consumption falls to give incentives to the worker to search for another job. No dismissal delays are optimal if exogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous
Compensation (psychology) · Consumption (sociology) · Dismissal · Economics · Incentive · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Notice · Severance · Unemployment · Employment and Welfare Studies · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions · Law
Job Security Provisions and Employment
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance
The European Unemployment Dilemma
The Political Economy of Employment Protection
The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard
Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment
Efficient Unemployment Insurance
Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria
The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time
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The Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment in Britain
Unemployment Responses to ‘Skill‐biased’ Technology Shocks
The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,27 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2015 - 2022 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |