Child Labour and Resistance to Change

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9722396
AutoresGiorgio Bellettini (0000-0002-6768-9506, Ifo Institute for Economic Research), Carlotta Berti Ceroni (0000-0002-2196-2087, Bocconi University), Gianmarco I P Ottaviano (Center for Economic and Policy Research)
Año2005
Volumen72
Número287
Páginas397-411
Fecha de publicación2005-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00422.x
OpenAlexW2131242267
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas13

We study the interaction between technological innovation, investment in human capital and child labour. In a two‐stage game, first firms decide on innovation, then households decide on education. In equilibrium the presence of inefficient child labour depends on parameters related to technology, parents' altruism and the diffusion of firms' property. Child labour is due either to firms' reluctance to innovate or to households' unwillingness to educate, or both. In some cases, compulsory schooling laws or a ban on child labour are welfare‐reducing, whereas a subsidy for innovation is the right tool to eliminate child labour and increase welfare

Altruism (biology) · Capital (architecture) · Child labour · Economics · Human capital · Investment (military) · Labour economics · Market economy · Subsidy · Technological change · Welfare · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Law · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare