Bribes and Bureaucracy Size

The Strategy of Watering Down Corruption

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9724045
AutoresMaurizio Caserta (0000-0003-1470-6656, University of Catania Italy), Livio Ferrante (0000-0002-1264-8248, University of Catania Italy), Francesco Reito (0000-0002-0469-1908, University of Catania Italy)
Año2022
Volumen89
Número353
Páginas191-213
Fecha de publicación2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecca.12396
OpenAlexW3205683678
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas38

We present a simple agency model with a revenue‐maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non‐linear relationship between potential and perceived corruption and, specifically, three distinct policy regimes in which the opportunistic behaviour is curbed, eradicated or tolerated. Different regimes are characterized by different bureaucracy sizes, and we conjecture that low levels of perceived corruption may, in some circumstances, be due to a dilution effect of bribery cases on large numbers of public employees. Some simple descriptive evidence on European regions appears to confirm our theoretical insights

Agency (philosophy) · Bureaucracy · Business · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Language change · Payment · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Revenue · Simple (philosophy) · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization