Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Adverse Selection

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9725375
AutoresHeski Bar‐Isaac (University of Toronto CEPR and CRESSE, autor de correspondencia), Clare Leaver (0000-0002-9743-2613, University of Oxford Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)
Año2022
Volumen89
Número356
Páginas849-861
Fecha de publicación2022-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecca.12441
OpenAlexW4291163689
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas31

This paper presents a model of a competitive labour market where workers vary in firm‐specific and general skills, and firms choose the kind of information to disclose. We show that provision of general training, recruitment, and outplacement are linked. Disclosing general human capital information on bad matches but revealing nothing about good matches (information disclosure that resembles outplacement support in professional service firms) leads to an efficient allocation of workers and creates adverse selection that enables workers to pay for general training. It also implies that wages of released workers can be higher than wages of those who are retained

Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Business · Economic growth · Economics · Human capital · Human capital theory · Labour economics · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Service (business) · Training (meteorology) · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Marketing · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy