The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9725708
AutoresPatrick Herbst (0000-0003-2916-7456, University of Stirling), Uwe Walz (0000-0003-4287-3486, Goethe University Frankfurt)
Año2017
Volumen84
Número333
Páginas54-77
Fecha de publicación2017-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecca.12183
OpenAlexW1482222759
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas41

Suppliers play a major role in firms' innovation processes. We analyse ownership and technology choices in vertical R&D collaborations. Under non‐contractible R&D outcomes, trade‐offs arise between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold‐up reduction). Stronger downstream competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier and favours contracting over ownership rather than specific performance contracts. Downstream ownership is combined with the specific technology if the supplier's expertise is more pronounced or the specific technology is more productive. Contracts incorporating exit clauses increase the gains from collaborations

Business · Competition (biology) · Contractible space · Downstream (manufacturing) · Economics · Industrial organization · Investment (military) · Microeconomics · Productivity · Vertical Integration · Corporate Finance and Governance · Innovation Policy and RD · Intellectual Property and Patents · Marketing