Cartel Stability in an Exhaustible Resource Model
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9726563 |
|---|---|
| Autores | J Thomas (0000-0003-3933-1264, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1992 |
| Volumen | 59 |
| Número | 235 |
| Páginas | 279 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1992-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Editorial | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2554602 |
| OpenAlex | W2006529258 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 4 |
A simple oligopolistic common-pool exhaustible resource game is considered.By analysing punishment strategies, including optimal punishments, it is possible to determine which cartel agreements are implementable in a non-cooperative play of the game.Joint-profit maximizing allocations are sustainable for sufficiently low discounting, but in general it is shown that no folk-theorem exists for this model.In particular, for sufficiently high elasticities of demand, it is shown that optimal punishments are not sufficiently severe to enforce stationary symmetric extraction paths, thus confirming the hypothesis that sufficient market power is needed for a cartel to be stable
Cartel · Collusion · Economics · Microeconomics · Natural resource economics · Resource (disambiguation) · Stability (learning theory) · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economics of Agriculture and Food Markets
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,03 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1996 - 1996 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |