Signalling, Inequality and the Social Structure

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9727504
AutoresA Ferrer (0000-0002-7385-2381, University of Calgary, autor de correspondencia), Ana M Ferrer
Año2005
Volumen72
Número287
Páginas515-529
Fecha de publicación2005-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00428.x
OpenAlexW2122819518
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas13

This paper proposes a theory of endogenous transmission of social status through signalling in the labour market. A signalling game is analysed, in which education, acting as a signalling good, determines one's position in society. The economy's degree of inequality is shown to be a determinant of whether a society is ‘aristocratic’, where high income is the source of social standing, or ‘meritocratic’, bestowing status on high ability. Each social structure shows a different balance between production efficiency and social factors such as equality or mobility

Balance (ability) · Economic growth · Economics · Inequality · Labour economics · Market economy · Meritocracy · Microeconomics · Position (finance) · Signalling · Social change · Social mobility · Social position · Social science · Social status · Sociology · Economic theories and models · Finance · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Psychology