Testing mixed strategies in the field

An experiment with soccer penalty kicks

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9727652
AutoresJuan Sentana (Universidad Pontificia Comillas, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Volumen92
Número368
Páginas1231-1246
Fecha de publicación2025-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecca.70002
OpenAlexW4412383603
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas26

I conduct a (quasi) field experiment in the soccer field with junior players to study if non‐professionals satisfy the implications of mixed strategy equilibrium when repeatedly facing the same opponents in the penalty kick game. By having repeated observations on different pairs of soccer players, a rare situation in real life, I can not only deal with the heterogeneity of the optimal strategies across pairs of players, but also study possible interactions between the actions of the players. My empirical results are consistent with the theory, even though the least experienced goalkeepers tend to replicate each other's actions. Interestingly, when all pairs are erroneously treated as a homogeneous one, I find rejections of the equilibrium implications, highlighting the importance of heterogeneity for determining mixed strategy play at the non‐professional level

Aeronautics · Field (mathematics) · Artificial Intelligence in Games · Computer Science · Educational Games and Gamification · Engineering · Mathematics · Sports Analytics and Performance