Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9727803
AutoresMARTIN ALTEMEYER‐BARTSCHER, Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher (Chemnitz University of Technology), Dirk Rübbelke (0000-0002-9934-8570, CICERO Center for International Climate Research), DIRK T G RÜBBELKE, Eytan Sheshinski (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Año2010
Volumen77
Número308
Páginas775-784
Fecha de publicación2010-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00796.x
OpenAlexW1914488627
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas20

International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free‐rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side‐payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side‐payments, in turn, are self‐financed by means of externality‐correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto‐efficient outcome can be attained

Business · Coase theorem · Economics · Externality · Free rider problem · Free riding · Incentive · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Order (exchange) · Pareto principle · Payment · Private good · Public economics · Public good · Transaction cost · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Economic theories and models · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law