Playing with Fire
Pre-Electoral Fiscal Manipulation and the Risk of a Speculative Attack
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9976972 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Benjamin Nyblade (University of British Columbia), Angela O’mahony (RAND Corporation), Angela O'Mahony (RAND Corporation) |
| Año | 2014 |
| Volumen | 58 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 828-838 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2014-11-22 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/isqu.12168 |
| OpenAlex | W2152595133 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 47 |
Conventional wisdom holds that voters in developing countries fail to punish pervasive pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. However, we argue that governments are unlikely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when facing a high risk of speculative currency attacks. In particular, under fixed exchange rates, governments are less likely to engage in fiscal electioneering when either their real exchange rate is highly appreciated or their foreign exchange reserves are low. In contrast, under a flexible exchange rate, neither a country's real exchange rate nor its reserves affects governments' decision to engage in fiscal manipulation. Our argument receives support through a quantitative analysis of government budget balances in 97 developing countries from 1975 to 2005
Argument (complex analysis · Currency · Developing country · Economic growth · Economics · Exchange rate · Fiscal policy · Government (linguistics · International economics · Monetary economics · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
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| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,5 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |