Neil Rickman
Biographic Data
| ID | 1000085 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Neil Rickman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Neil |
| FAMILY NAME | Rickman |
| SIGNATURE | RICKMAN N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Surrey |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
No Win, No Fee’, Cost‐shifting and the Costs of Civil Litigation
Expenditure on legal services has been rising for much of the last two decades and has attracted considerable policy attention in the UK. We argue that an important reason for this increase lies within the introduction of 'no win no fee' schemes in 1995 and a subsequent amendment which allowed claimants to shift additional costs (introduced by the 'no win no fee' schemes) onto losing defendants in 2000. In this paper, we evaluate the effect of th…
Changing experience of adverse medical events in the National Health Service
Enterprise Liability, Risk Pooling, and Diagnostic Care
The safety of patients is an important responsibility of health care providers, and significant compensation costs may arise if providers are negligent. A widely debated option involves liability for such compensation being placed with the hospital rather than the individual clinician, a system known as “enterprise liability.” In the United States, partial adoption of enterprise liability and proposals for its universal introduction have accompan…
Why are some care homes better than others? An empirical study of the factors associated with quality of care for older people in residential homes in Surrey, England
This paper reports an empirical study that investigated associations between the quality of care received by older people in residential settings and features of the care homes in which they live. Data were gathered from the first announced inspection reports (2002-2003) of all 258 care homes for older people in one county of England (Surrey). The number of inspected standards failed in each home was used as the main indicator of quality of care.…
Favouritism and Financial Incentives
Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may harm those who are not so favoured. We address this issue in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer. We study the effects of professional referees on a common measure of referee bias: length of injury time in close matches. We find that referees exercised a degree of favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards, having controlled for selection and soccer‐wi…
The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK
We present evidence on employee theft in the UK using data on actual recorded crime, in a model where employees are ‘rational cheaters’ whose theft decisions may also be influenced by individual characteristics. We produce hypotheses about the role of labour market deterrence and individual influences on employee theft. We then examine the role of these influences using regional crime data supplemented by data from the UK Labour Force Survey and …
Third Party Contingency« Contracts in Settlement and Litigation
We present a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. They combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these »Third Party Contingency« (TPC) contracts. A TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only o…
The Economics of Clinical Negligence Reform in England
In Britain, the NHS spends millions of pounds a year compensating patients injured during medical treatment. Compensation is paid if the patient can demonstrate that treatment was supplied negligently. However, concern over the cost, effectiveness and administrative efficiency of this approach has led jurisdictions like Sweden, New Zealand and some US states to alter the basis for compensation, and the Department of Health has now published propo…
Regulating Providers’ Reimbursement in a Mixed Market for Health Care
Hospitals can be reimbursed for their costs in many ways. Several authors have investigated the effects of these reimbursement rules on physician incentives and, therefore, on the quantity of services provided to patients. A form of (linear) cost‐sharing tends to emerge as the socially efficient reimbursement policy. We present a model of hospital reimbursement, based on Ellis and McGuire (1986). The new feature is that physicians can supply priv…
Delay and Settlement in Litigation
Journal Article Delay and Settlement in Litigation Get access Paul Fenn, Paul Fenn University of Nottingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Neil Rickman Neil Rickman University of Surrey Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 109, Issue 457, 1 July 1999, Pages 476–491, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00458 Published: 25 December 2001
Delay and Settlement in Litigation
Journal Article Delay and Settlement in Litigation Get access Paul Fenn, Paul Fenn University of Nottingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Neil Rickman Neil Rickman University of Surrey Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 109, Issue 457, 1 July 1999, Pages 476–491, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00458 Published: 25 December 2001
Why are some care homes better than others? An empirical study of the factors associated with quality of care for older people in residential homes in Surrey, England
This paper reports an empirical study that investigated associations between the quality of care received by older people in residential settings and features of the care homes in which they live. Data were gathered from the first announced inspection reports (2002-2003) of all 258 care homes for older people in one county of England (Surrey). The number of inspected standards failed in each home was used as the main indicator of quality of care.…
Regulating Providers’ Reimbursement in a Mixed Market for Health Care
Hospitals can be reimbursed for their costs in many ways. Several authors have investigated the effects of these reimbursement rules on physician incentives and, therefore, on the quantity of services provided to patients. A form of (linear) cost‐sharing tends to emerge as the socially efficient reimbursement policy. We present a model of hospital reimbursement, based on Ellis and McGuire (1986). The new feature is that physicians can supply priv…
Changing experience of adverse medical events in the National Health Service
Enterprise Liability, Risk Pooling, and Diagnostic Care
The safety of patients is an important responsibility of health care providers, and significant compensation costs may arise if providers are negligent. A widely debated option involves liability for such compensation being placed with the hospital rather than the individual clinician, a system known as “enterprise liability.” In the United States, partial adoption of enterprise liability and proposals for its universal introduction have accompan…
Favouritism and Financial Incentives
Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may harm those who are not so favoured. We address this issue in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer. We study the effects of professional referees on a common measure of referee bias: length of injury time in close matches. We find that referees exercised a degree of favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards, having controlled for selection and soccer‐wi…
The Economics of Clinical Negligence Reform in England
In Britain, the NHS spends millions of pounds a year compensating patients injured during medical treatment. Compensation is paid if the patient can demonstrate that treatment was supplied negligently. However, concern over the cost, effectiveness and administrative efficiency of this approach has led jurisdictions like Sweden, New Zealand and some US states to alter the basis for compensation, and the Department of Health has now published propo…
Regulating Providers’ Reimbursement in a Mixed Market for Health Care
Hospitals can be reimbursed for their costs in many ways. Several authors have investigated the effects of these reimbursement rules on physician incentives and, therefore, on the quantity of services provided to patients. A form of (linear) cost‐sharing tends to emerge as the socially efficient reimbursement policy. We present a model of hospital reimbursement, based on Ellis and McGuire (1986). The new feature is that physicians can supply priv…
Delay and Settlement in Litigation
Journal Article Delay and Settlement in Litigation Get access Paul Fenn, Paul Fenn University of Nottingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Neil Rickman Neil Rickman University of Surrey Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 109, Issue 457, 1 July 1999, Pages 476–491, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00458 Published: 25 December 2001
Third Party Contingency« Contracts in Settlement and Litigation
We present a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. They combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these »Third Party Contingency« (TPC) contracts. A TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only o…
The Economics of Clinical Negligence Reform in England
In Britain, the NHS spends millions of pounds a year compensating patients injured during medical treatment. Compensation is paid if the patient can demonstrate that treatment was supplied negligently. However, concern over the cost, effectiveness and administrative efficiency of this approach has led jurisdictions like Sweden, New Zealand and some US states to alter the basis for compensation, and the Department of Health has now published propo…
The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK
We present evidence on employee theft in the UK using data on actual recorded crime, in a model where employees are ‘rational cheaters’ whose theft decisions may also be influenced by individual characteristics. We produce hypotheses about the role of labour market deterrence and individual influences on employee theft. We then examine the role of these influences using regional crime data supplemented by data from the UK Labour Force Survey and …
Favouritism and Financial Incentives
Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may harm those who are not so favoured. We address this issue in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer. We study the effects of professional referees on a common measure of referee bias: length of injury time in close matches. We find that referees exercised a degree of favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards, having controlled for selection and soccer‐wi…
Why are some care homes better than others? An empirical study of the factors associated with quality of care for older people in residential homes in Surrey, England
This paper reports an empirical study that investigated associations between the quality of care received by older people in residential settings and features of the care homes in which they live. Data were gathered from the first announced inspection reports (2002-2003) of all 258 care homes for older people in one county of England (Surrey). The number of inspected standards failed in each home was used as the main indicator of quality of care.…
Enterprise Liability, Risk Pooling, and Diagnostic Care
The safety of patients is an important responsibility of health care providers, and significant compensation costs may arise if providers are negligent. A widely debated option involves liability for such compensation being placed with the hospital rather than the individual clinician, a system known as “enterprise liability.” In the United States, partial adoption of enterprise liability and proposals for its universal introduction have accompan…
No Win, No Fee’, Cost‐shifting and the Costs of Civil Litigation
Expenditure on legal services has been rising for much of the last two decades and has attracted considerable policy attention in the UK. We argue that an important reason for this increase lies within the introduction of 'no win no fee' schemes in 1995 and a subsequent amendment which allowed claimants to shift additional costs (introduced by the 'no win no fee' schemes) onto losing defendants in 2000. In this paper, we evaluate the effect of th…
Changing experience of adverse medical events in the National Health Service
Economics (8 works) · Business (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Actuarial science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Medical Malpractice and Liability Issues (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Harm (3 works) · Health care (3 works)