Peter Gildenhuys
Biographic Data
| ID | 1000503 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter Gildenhuys |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter |
| FAMILY NAME | Gildenhuys |
| SIGNATURE | GILDENHUYS P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lafayette College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Lotteries make science fairer
I argue that peer review systems for assigning scientific funding make things less fair than do lotteries that assign funding to research proposals at least partly on the basis of chance. Even though lotteries assign funding randomly, while peer review does so on the basis of morally weighty considerations, lotteries are no more or less fair than peer review as a funding disbursement mechanism. Despite this parity, lotteries make the broader inst…
Arbitrariness and Causation in Classical Population Genetics
I criticize some arguments against the causal interpretability of population genetics put forward by Denis Walsh ([2007], [2010]). In particular, I seek to undermine the contention that population genetics exhibits frame of reference relativity or subjectivity with respect to its formal representations. I also show that classical population genetics does not fall foul of some criteria for causal representation put forward by James Woodward ([2003…
Classical population genetics and the semantic approach to scientific theories
Causal Equations without Ceteris Paribus Clauses
Some writers have urged that evolutionary theory produces generalizations that hold only ceteris paribus, that is, provided “everything else is equal.” Others have claimed that all laws in the special sciences, or even all laws in science generally, hold only ceteris paribus. However, if we lack a way to determine when everything else really is equal, hedging generalizations with the phrase “ceteris paribus” renders those generalizations vacuous.…
An Explication of the Causal Dimension of Drift
Among philosophers, controversy over the notion of drift in population genetics is ongoing. This is at least partly because the notion of drift has an ambiguous usage among population geneticists. My goal in this paper is to explicate the causal dimension of drift, to say what causal influences are responsible for the stochasticity in population genetics models. It is commonplace for population genetics to oppose the influence of selection to tha…
Darwin, Herschel, and the role of analogy in Darwin’s origin
The Evolution of Altruism
In what follows, I critique the interpretation that Sober and Wilson offer of their group selection model in Unto Others. Sober and Wilson mistakenly claim that their model operates as an example of Simpson's paradox and defend an interpretation of their model according to which groups are operated upon by natural selection. In the place of their interpretation, I offer one that parallels the mathematical calculation of the model's outcome and do…
An Explication of the Causal Dimension of Drift
Among philosophers, controversy over the notion of drift in population genetics is ongoing. This is at least partly because the notion of drift has an ambiguous usage among population geneticists. My goal in this paper is to explicate the causal dimension of drift, to say what causal influences are responsible for the stochasticity in population genetics models. It is commonplace for population genetics to oppose the influence of selection to tha…
Arbitrariness and Causation in Classical Population Genetics
I criticize some arguments against the causal interpretability of population genetics put forward by Denis Walsh ([2007], [2010]). In particular, I seek to undermine the contention that population genetics exhibits frame of reference relativity or subjectivity with respect to its formal representations. I also show that classical population genetics does not fall foul of some criteria for causal representation put forward by James Woodward ([2003…
Darwin, Herschel, and the role of analogy in Darwin’s origin
The Evolution of Altruism
In what follows, I critique the interpretation that Sober and Wilson offer of their group selection model in Unto Others. Sober and Wilson mistakenly claim that their model operates as an example of Simpson's paradox and defend an interpretation of their model according to which groups are operated upon by natural selection. In the place of their interpretation, I offer one that parallels the mathematical calculation of the model's outcome and do…
The Evolution of Altruism
In what follows, I critique the interpretation that Sober and Wilson offer of their group selection model in Unto Others. Sober and Wilson mistakenly claim that their model operates as an example of Simpson's paradox and defend an interpretation of their model according to which groups are operated upon by natural selection. In the place of their interpretation, I offer one that parallels the mathematical calculation of the model's outcome and do…
Darwin, Herschel, and the role of analogy in Darwin’s origin
An Explication of the Causal Dimension of Drift
Among philosophers, controversy over the notion of drift in population genetics is ongoing. This is at least partly because the notion of drift has an ambiguous usage among population geneticists. My goal in this paper is to explicate the causal dimension of drift, to say what causal influences are responsible for the stochasticity in population genetics models. It is commonplace for population genetics to oppose the influence of selection to tha…
Causal Equations without Ceteris Paribus Clauses
Some writers have urged that evolutionary theory produces generalizations that hold only ceteris paribus, that is, provided “everything else is equal.” Others have claimed that all laws in the special sciences, or even all laws in science generally, hold only ceteris paribus. However, if we lack a way to determine when everything else really is equal, hedging generalizations with the phrase “ceteris paribus” renders those generalizations vacuous.…
Classical population genetics and the semantic approach to scientific theories
Arbitrariness and Causation in Classical Population Genetics
I criticize some arguments against the causal interpretability of population genetics put forward by Denis Walsh ([2007], [2010]). In particular, I seek to undermine the contention that population genetics exhibits frame of reference relativity or subjectivity with respect to its formal representations. I also show that classical population genetics does not fall foul of some criteria for causal representation put forward by James Woodward ([2003…
Lotteries make science fairer
I argue that peer review systems for assigning scientific funding make things less fair than do lotteries that assign funding to research proposals at least partly on the basis of chance. Even though lotteries assign funding randomly, while peer review does so on the basis of morally weighty considerations, lotteries are no more or less fair than peer review as a funding disbursement mechanism. Despite this parity, lotteries make the broader inst…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics (3 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works)