George Bealer
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1001128 |
|---|---|
| NOME | George Bealer |
| PRENOMES | George |
| SOBRENOME | Bealer |
| ASSINATURA | BEALER G |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Reed College |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1975 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2008 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Intuition and Modal Error
Modal intuitions are not only the primary source of modal knowledge but also the primary source of modal error. An explanation of how modal error arises—and, in particular, how erroneous modal intuitions arise—is an essential part of a comprehensive theory of knowledge and evidence. But, more than that, such an explanation is essential to identifying and eliminating modal errors in our day-to-day philosophical practice. According to the theory of…
Mental Causation
A Definition of Necessity
In the history of philosophy, especially its recent history, a number of definitions of necessity have been ventured.Most people, however, find these definitions either circular or subject to counterexamples.I will show that, given a broadly Fregean conception of properties, necessity does indeed have a noncircular counterexample-free definition.The argument has the following surprising consequence: a proposition is necessary iff it has a proof u…
Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance
The term ‘modal epistemology’ may be understood in three ways. First, as the theory of modal knowledge—knowledge of what is necessary and possible. Second, as the theory of possible knowledge-what sorts of knowledge are possible. Third, as the intersection of the first two: the theory of possible modal knowledge-that is, of what modal knowledge is possible.
Self-Consciousness
On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge
A Solution to Frege's Puzzle
My view that the English sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could sometimes be used to raise an empirical issue while 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could not shows that I do not treat the sentences as completely interchangeable. Further, it indicates that the mode of fixing the reference is relevant to our epistemic attitude toward the sentences expressed. How this relates to the question what 'propositions' are expressed by these sentences, whether thes…
The Incoherence of Empiricism
George Bealer, P F. Strawson; The Incoherence of Empiricism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 July 1992, Pages 99–144, http
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism
Quality and Concept
Quality and Concept
This book provides a unified theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). The book explores the two traditional conceptions of PRPs and shows how they can be captured by a single theory.
An inconsistency in functionalism
Predication and matter
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism
A Solution to Frege's Puzzle
My view that the English sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could sometimes be used to raise an empirical issue while 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could not shows that I do not treat the sentences as completely interchangeable. Further, it indicates that the mode of fixing the reference is relevant to our epistemic attitude toward the sentences expressed. How this relates to the question what 'propositions' are expressed by these sentences, whether thes…
Mental Causation
Self-Consciousness
Predication and matter
An inconsistency in functionalism
Quality and Concept
This book provides a unified theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). The book explores the two traditional conceptions of PRPs and shows how they can be captured by a single theory.
Quality and Concept
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism
The Incoherence of Empiricism
George Bealer, P F. Strawson; The Incoherence of Empiricism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 July 1992, Pages 99–144, http
A Solution to Frege's Puzzle
My view that the English sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could sometimes be used to raise an empirical issue while 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could not shows that I do not treat the sentences as completely interchangeable. Further, it indicates that the mode of fixing the reference is relevant to our epistemic attitude toward the sentences expressed. How this relates to the question what 'propositions' are expressed by these sentences, whether thes…
On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge
Self-Consciousness
Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance
The term ‘modal epistemology’ may be understood in three ways. First, as the theory of modal knowledge—knowledge of what is necessary and possible. Second, as the theory of possible knowledge-what sorts of knowledge are possible. Third, as the intersection of the first two: the theory of possible modal knowledge-that is, of what modal knowledge is possible.
A Definition of Necessity
In the history of philosophy, especially its recent history, a number of definitions of necessity have been ventured.Most people, however, find these definitions either circular or subject to counterexamples.I will show that, given a broadly Fregean conception of properties, necessity does indeed have a noncircular counterexample-free definition.The argument has the following surprising consequence: a proposition is necessary iff it has a proof u…
Mental Causation
Intuition and Modal Error
Modal intuitions are not only the primary source of modal knowledge but also the primary source of modal error. An explanation of how modal error arises—and, in particular, how erroneous modal intuitions arise—is an essential part of a comprehensive theory of knowledge and evidence. But, more than that, such an explanation is essential to identifying and eliminating modal errors in our day-to-day philosophical practice. According to the theory of…
Epistemology (11 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Psychology (3 obras) · Art history (2 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (2 obras)