Thomas Rixen
Biographic Data
| ID | 1002111 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas Rixen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas |
| FAMILY NAME | Rixen |
| SIGNATURE | RIXEN T |
| AFFILIATIONS | WZB Berlin Social Science Center |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8777-5949 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 174 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 22 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
The trilemma of corporate taxation in a globalized world
As multinational corporations (MNCs) have come to dominate the globalized economy, taxing them has become one of the most challenging tasks. To explain the trade-offs facing governments, we propose a broad conceptual lens – the trilemma of international taxation. In this tri-lemma, only two of three goals can be achieved simultaneously: globalization, sovereignty, and revenue. We use it to (1) show that different groups of countries – big industr…
Specialized Committees of International Organizations an Important Source of Organizational Autonomy
Assigning the preparation of decisions to specialized committees composed of member state representatives is a widespread response to the ‘governor's dilemma’, that is, the tension between competence and control, in international organizations (IOs). We theorize a causal mechanism referring to self‐selection and agenda‐setting effects and show how the resulting division of labor among IO bodies produces organizational influence beyond current acc…
Explaining institutional change in global financial regulation
Taxation
This article makes four claims: First, tax systems at the national, regional and global level are regulatory systems. They can and should be studied as that. Second, taxation is an important extension to regulatory scholars’ empirical field of inquiry. It is a hard case to test prominent theories of new, softer modes of governance. Third, in the era of liberalization and globalization tax governance exhibits similar institutional changes as regul…
A victim of regulatory arbitrage? Automatic exchange of information and the use of golden visas and corporate shells
The multilateral adoption of the automatic exchange of information (AEI) on bank accounts held by nonresidents was a breakthrough in the fight against cross‐border tax evasion, which led to a substantial reduction in the value of bank deposits and investment portfolios in traditional tax havens. However, there is suspicion that sophisticated tax evaders engage in regulatory arbitrage of AEI provisions. We examine whether two widely discussed secr…
New room to maneuver? National tax policy under increasing financial transparency
Why have Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) governments raised taxes on dividends at the shareholder level since 2008? Previous research points to the importance of budget deficits and voter demand for compensatory fairness in the aftermath of the financial crisis. We complement this literature by showing that the effect of domestic drivers of tax increases on capital income crucially depends on the level of financial t…
Is neoliberalism still spreading? The impact of international cooperation on capital taxation
The downward trend in capital taxes since the 1980s has recently reversed for personal capital income. At the same time, it continued for corporate profits. Why have these tax rates di-verged after a long period of parallel decline? We argue that the answer lies in different levels of change in the fights against tax evasion and tax avoidance. The fight against evasion by households progressed significantly since 2009, culminating in the multilat…
Debate
Administering the Surplus
This article studies the tax and fiscal policies of the second grand coalition under Chancellor Merkel. It demonstrates that the government contented itself with merely administering balanced budgets or surpluses, instead of seizing the opportunity of exceptionally good economic conditions and low interest rates to implement important structural reforms and increase investment in public infrastructure. This outcome can be explained by two factors…
Historical Institutionalism and International Relations
"This book argues that Historical Institutionalism (HI)--an analytical approach so far mostly applied within comparative politics--is particularly well suited for understanding the dynamics of international institutional development over time. It is the first book to collect original, empirical research applying Historical Institutionalism to international institutions."--Jacket.
Hehre Ziele, wenig Zählbares
Putting path dependence in its place
Stalled progress on explaining institutional change is, in part, the result of two conceptual challenges that hinder effective theory building: concept stretching and concept proliferation. These problems affect a hallmark concept of institutional change, path dependence, whose usefulness has been curtailed by the variety of meanings attributed to it. This article seeks to remedy concept stretching and proliferation by developing a taxonomy of in…
Ambitious Goals, Deficient Output
Tax policy was at the heart of the Merkel II government's reform agenda. The CDU/CSU and FDP promised significant tax cuts and simplifications of the tax system. During their term, however, they remained the least active of all German governments of the last four decades. Why? This article argues that a combination of factors relating to the dynamics of electoral competition and structural problem pressure can explain this outcome: The new consti…
Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble
A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two‐level game. On the internati…
Tax Competition and Global Background Justice
How Effective is the European Union's Savings Tax Directive? Evidence from Four EU Member States
This article examines the strategies employed by individual investors to evade cross‐border capital income taxation, and evaluates the effectiveness of the European Union Savings Tax Directive (STD). Using data for four European countries, the results are, first, individual investors adapted to the institutional changes implemented by the STD before it became effective in 2005; second, the strategy of reallocating assets from debt to equity produ…
Tax Competition and Inequality
In this article I present the normative case for global tax governance. I argue that, contrary to an influential part of the literature, national tax policy choices cause significant externalities for other nation states. Focusing in business taxation, I show that tax competition undermines the integrity and distributive principles of domestic tax systems, and aggravates the inequality between developed and developing countries. Further, I demons…
From double tax avoidance to tax competition
This article presents a history of international tax governance and offers a rationalist reconstruction of its trajectory. As an unintended consequence of its institutional setup, the tax regime, which originally only dealt with double tax avoidance, produces harmful tax competition. Despite this negative effect there are only incremental and partial changes of the regime, which are insufficient to curb tax competition. I argue that this developm…
Bilateralism or multilateralism? The political economy of avoiding international double taxation
Why do states cooperate bilaterally or multilaterally? This article addresses the issue using the example of international double tax avoidance. It is argued that double tax avoidance exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the asymmetry of investment flows between treaty partners. Since investment flows are defined dyadically, bilateral bargaining can best …
Rgaining over the Avoidance of Double Taxation
Previous empirical studies have mainly analyzed tax competition, neglecting the role of tax cooperation in international taxation. We focus on German double taxation agreements (DTAs) and show for up to 45 tax treaties that the bargaining outcomes depend on investment asymmetries between the countries. A transition from a purely symmetrical country pair to a situation where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in only one direction would increas…
The Political Economy of International Tax Governance
Covering the period from the 1920s, when international tax policy was solely about avoiding double taxation, to the present era of international tax competition, Rixen investigates the fate of 'the po
The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation
Trade relations are governed by a multilateral agreement, whereas the avoidance of double taxation rests on a network of about 2000 separate bilateral treaties. What accounts for the difference in the institutional form? Distinguishing between the bargaining and agreement stage of international cooperation, we first show that the institutional design of both regimes is more complex than commonly assumed. Both exhibit a mix of bilateral and multil…
Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State
Putting path dependence in its place
Stalled progress on explaining institutional change is, in part, the result of two conceptual challenges that hinder effective theory building: concept stretching and concept proliferation. These problems affect a hallmark concept of institutional change, path dependence, whose usefulness has been curtailed by the variety of meanings attributed to it. This article seeks to remedy concept stretching and proliferation by developing a taxonomy of in…
From double tax avoidance to tax competition
This article presents a history of international tax governance and offers a rationalist reconstruction of its trajectory. As an unintended consequence of its institutional setup, the tax regime, which originally only dealt with double tax avoidance, produces harmful tax competition. Despite this negative effect there are only incremental and partial changes of the regime, which are insufficient to curb tax competition. I argue that this developm…
Tax Competition and Global Background Justice
Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble
A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two‐level game. On the internati…
Is neoliberalism still spreading? The impact of international cooperation on capital taxation
The downward trend in capital taxes since the 1980s has recently reversed for personal capital income. At the same time, it continued for corporate profits. Why have these tax rates di-verged after a long period of parallel decline? We argue that the answer lies in different levels of change in the fights against tax evasion and tax avoidance. The fight against evasion by households progressed significantly since 2009, culminating in the multilat…
How Effective is the European Union's Savings Tax Directive? Evidence from Four EU Member States
This article examines the strategies employed by individual investors to evade cross‐border capital income taxation, and evaluates the effectiveness of the European Union Savings Tax Directive (STD). Using data for four European countries, the results are, first, individual investors adapted to the institutional changes implemented by the STD before it became effective in 2005; second, the strategy of reallocating assets from debt to equity produ…
Administering the Surplus
This article studies the tax and fiscal policies of the second grand coalition under Chancellor Merkel. It demonstrates that the government contented itself with merely administering balanced budgets or surpluses, instead of seizing the opportunity of exceptionally good economic conditions and low interest rates to implement important structural reforms and increase investment in public infrastructure. This outcome can be explained by two factors…
A victim of regulatory arbitrage? Automatic exchange of information and the use of golden visas and corporate shells
The multilateral adoption of the automatic exchange of information (AEI) on bank accounts held by nonresidents was a breakthrough in the fight against cross‐border tax evasion, which led to a substantial reduction in the value of bank deposits and investment portfolios in traditional tax havens. However, there is suspicion that sophisticated tax evaders engage in regulatory arbitrage of AEI provisions. We examine whether two widely discussed secr…
Tax Competition and Inequality
In this article I present the normative case for global tax governance. I argue that, contrary to an influential part of the literature, national tax policy choices cause significant externalities for other nation states. Focusing in business taxation, I show that tax competition undermines the integrity and distributive principles of domestic tax systems, and aggravates the inequality between developed and developing countries. Further, I demons…
The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation
Trade relations are governed by a multilateral agreement, whereas the avoidance of double taxation rests on a network of about 2000 separate bilateral treaties. What accounts for the difference in the institutional form? Distinguishing between the bargaining and agreement stage of international cooperation, we first show that the institutional design of both regimes is more complex than commonly assumed. Both exhibit a mix of bilateral and multil…
New room to maneuver? National tax policy under increasing financial transparency
Why have Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) governments raised taxes on dividends at the shareholder level since 2008? Previous research points to the importance of budget deficits and voter demand for compensatory fairness in the aftermath of the financial crisis. We complement this literature by showing that the effect of domestic drivers of tax increases on capital income crucially depends on the level of financial t…
Bilateralism or multilateralism? The political economy of avoiding international double taxation
Why do states cooperate bilaterally or multilaterally? This article addresses the issue using the example of international double tax avoidance. It is argued that double tax avoidance exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the asymmetry of investment flows between treaty partners. Since investment flows are defined dyadically, bilateral bargaining can best …
Taxation
This article makes four claims: First, tax systems at the national, regional and global level are regulatory systems. They can and should be studied as that. Second, taxation is an important extension to regulatory scholars’ empirical field of inquiry. It is a hard case to test prominent theories of new, softer modes of governance. Third, in the era of liberalization and globalization tax governance exhibits similar institutional changes as regul…
Ambitious Goals, Deficient Output
Tax policy was at the heart of the Merkel II government's reform agenda. The CDU/CSU and FDP promised significant tax cuts and simplifications of the tax system. During their term, however, they remained the least active of all German governments of the last four decades. Why? This article argues that a combination of factors relating to the dynamics of electoral competition and structural problem pressure can explain this outcome: The new consti…
Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State
The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation
Trade relations are governed by a multilateral agreement, whereas the avoidance of double taxation rests on a network of about 2000 separate bilateral treaties. What accounts for the difference in the institutional form? Distinguishing between the bargaining and agreement stage of international cooperation, we first show that the institutional design of both regimes is more complex than commonly assumed. Both exhibit a mix of bilateral and multil…
The Political Economy of International Tax Governance
Covering the period from the 1920s, when international tax policy was solely about avoiding double taxation, to the present era of international tax competition, Rixen investigates the fate of 'the po
Rgaining over the Avoidance of Double Taxation
Previous empirical studies have mainly analyzed tax competition, neglecting the role of tax cooperation in international taxation. We focus on German double taxation agreements (DTAs) and show for up to 45 tax treaties that the bargaining outcomes depend on investment asymmetries between the countries. A transition from a purely symmetrical country pair to a situation where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in only one direction would increas…
From double tax avoidance to tax competition
This article presents a history of international tax governance and offers a rationalist reconstruction of its trajectory. As an unintended consequence of its institutional setup, the tax regime, which originally only dealt with double tax avoidance, produces harmful tax competition. Despite this negative effect there are only incremental and partial changes of the regime, which are insufficient to curb tax competition. I argue that this developm…
Bilateralism or multilateralism? The political economy of avoiding international double taxation
Why do states cooperate bilaterally or multilaterally? This article addresses the issue using the example of international double tax avoidance. It is argued that double tax avoidance exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the asymmetry of investment flows between treaty partners. Since investment flows are defined dyadically, bilateral bargaining can best …
Tax Competition and Inequality
In this article I present the normative case for global tax governance. I argue that, contrary to an influential part of the literature, national tax policy choices cause significant externalities for other nation states. Focusing in business taxation, I show that tax competition undermines the integrity and distributive principles of domestic tax systems, and aggravates the inequality between developed and developing countries. Further, I demons…
Tax Competition and Global Background Justice
How Effective is the European Union's Savings Tax Directive? Evidence from Four EU Member States
This article examines the strategies employed by individual investors to evade cross‐border capital income taxation, and evaluates the effectiveness of the European Union Savings Tax Directive (STD). Using data for four European countries, the results are, first, individual investors adapted to the institutional changes implemented by the STD before it became effective in 2005; second, the strategy of reallocating assets from debt to equity produ…
Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble
A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two‐level game. On the internati…
Ambitious Goals, Deficient Output
Tax policy was at the heart of the Merkel II government's reform agenda. The CDU/CSU and FDP promised significant tax cuts and simplifications of the tax system. During their term, however, they remained the least active of all German governments of the last four decades. Why? This article argues that a combination of factors relating to the dynamics of electoral competition and structural problem pressure can explain this outcome: The new consti…
Hehre Ziele, wenig Zählbares
Putting path dependence in its place
Stalled progress on explaining institutional change is, in part, the result of two conceptual challenges that hinder effective theory building: concept stretching and concept proliferation. These problems affect a hallmark concept of institutional change, path dependence, whose usefulness has been curtailed by the variety of meanings attributed to it. This article seeks to remedy concept stretching and proliferation by developing a taxonomy of in…
Historical Institutionalism and International Relations
"This book argues that Historical Institutionalism (HI)--an analytical approach so far mostly applied within comparative politics--is particularly well suited for understanding the dynamics of international institutional development over time. It is the first book to collect original, empirical research applying Historical Institutionalism to international institutions."--Jacket.
Debate
Administering the Surplus
This article studies the tax and fiscal policies of the second grand coalition under Chancellor Merkel. It demonstrates that the government contented itself with merely administering balanced budgets or surpluses, instead of seizing the opportunity of exceptionally good economic conditions and low interest rates to implement important structural reforms and increase investment in public infrastructure. This outcome can be explained by two factors…
Is neoliberalism still spreading? The impact of international cooperation on capital taxation
The downward trend in capital taxes since the 1980s has recently reversed for personal capital income. At the same time, it continued for corporate profits. Why have these tax rates di-verged after a long period of parallel decline? We argue that the answer lies in different levels of change in the fights against tax evasion and tax avoidance. The fight against evasion by households progressed significantly since 2009, culminating in the multilat…
Taxation
This article makes four claims: First, tax systems at the national, regional and global level are regulatory systems. They can and should be studied as that. Second, taxation is an important extension to regulatory scholars’ empirical field of inquiry. It is a hard case to test prominent theories of new, softer modes of governance. Third, in the era of liberalization and globalization tax governance exhibits similar institutional changes as regul…
A victim of regulatory arbitrage? Automatic exchange of information and the use of golden visas and corporate shells
The multilateral adoption of the automatic exchange of information (AEI) on bank accounts held by nonresidents was a breakthrough in the fight against cross‐border tax evasion, which led to a substantial reduction in the value of bank deposits and investment portfolios in traditional tax havens. However, there is suspicion that sophisticated tax evaders engage in regulatory arbitrage of AEI provisions. We examine whether two widely discussed secr…
New room to maneuver? National tax policy under increasing financial transparency
Why have Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) governments raised taxes on dividends at the shareholder level since 2008? Previous research points to the importance of budget deficits and voter demand for compensatory fairness in the aftermath of the financial crisis. We complement this literature by showing that the effect of domestic drivers of tax increases on capital income crucially depends on the level of financial t…
Specialized Committees of International Organizations an Important Source of Organizational Autonomy
Assigning the preparation of decisions to specialized committees composed of member state representatives is a widespread response to the ‘governor's dilemma’, that is, the tension between competence and control, in international organizations (IOs). We theorize a causal mechanism referring to self‐selection and agenda‐setting effects and show how the resulting division of labor among IO bodies produces organizational influence beyond current acc…
Explaining institutional change in global financial regulation
The trilemma of corporate taxation in a globalized world
As multinational corporations (MNCs) have come to dominate the globalized economy, taxing them has become one of the most challenging tasks. To explain the trade-offs facing governments, we propose a broad conceptual lens – the trilemma of international taxation. In this tri-lemma, only two of three goals can be achieved simultaneously: globalization, sovereignty, and revenue. We use it to (1) show that different groups of countries – big industr…
Economics (17 works) · Political science (16 works) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (13 works) · Public economics (13 works) · Law (11 works) · International economics (10 works) · Double taxation (8 works) · Business (7 works) · Tax avoidance (7 works) · Taxation and Compliance Studies (7 works)