David Colaço
Biographic Data
| ID | 1002751 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Colaço |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Colaço |
| SIGNATURE | COLAÇO D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Munich School of Philosophy |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7877-5664 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
On Consistently Assessing Alleged Mnemonic Systems (or, why isn’t Immune Memory “really” Memory?)
How should we assess systems whose mnemonic status is contested? There are, for instance, debates over whether immune memory is “really” memory, or akin to memory as ordinarily attributed to human cognition. In this paper, I challenge two arguments often given by detractors in this debate. The first is that the system does not exhibit errors exemplified in human memory. The second is that it can be described and explained in causal terms alone. I…
When Engrams Become Exograms
The advent of novel technologies has bolstered the idea of extended memory, where memory processes extend beyond the human body or brain. However, investigations of extended memory, and extended cognition more generally, do not address how biological componentry might be externalized from the body and into artifacts. In the paper, I introduce and explore a case where human engrams are externalized into exograms, stored via organic data memory tec…
Where memory resides
Recent proposals that the substrate of memory is molecular raise questions about where this molecular model stands in relation to the dominant synaptic model of memory. In this article, we address the perceived rivalry between these models and ask whether they can be integrated. We argue that addressing rivalry or integration requires delineating the explananda of synaptic and molecular models, as well as revisiting assumptions about how these mo…
Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive
Philosophers and scientists propose the idea that plants are cognitive, which has been met with criticisms. These criticisms focus on the fact that plants do not possess the properties traditionally associated with cognition. By contrast, several proponents introduce novel ways to conceptualize cognition. How should we make sense of this debate? In this paper, I argue that the plant cognition debate is not about whether plants meet a set of well-…
What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, Hypotheses, and “Kinding in Progress”
This paper accounts for broad definitions of memory , which extend to paradigmatic memory phenomena, like episodic memory in humans, and phenomena in worms and sea snails. These definitions may seem too broad, suggesting that they extend to phenomena that don’t count as memory or illustrate that memory is not a natural kind. However, these responses fail to consider a definition as a hypothesis . As opposed to construing definitions as expressing…
Contextual framing of loss impacts harm avoidance during risky spatial decisions
Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to…
Rip it up and start again
What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, Hypotheses, and “Kinding in Progress”
This paper accounts for broad definitions of memory , which extend to paradigmatic memory phenomena, like episodic memory in humans, and phenomena in worms and sea snails. These definitions may seem too broad, suggesting that they extend to phenomena that don’t count as memory or illustrate that memory is not a natural kind. However, these responses fail to consider a definition as a hypothesis . As opposed to construing definitions as expressing…
Rip it up and start again
Where memory resides
Recent proposals that the substrate of memory is molecular raise questions about where this molecular model stands in relation to the dominant synaptic model of memory. In this article, we address the perceived rivalry between these models and ask whether they can be integrated. We argue that addressing rivalry or integration requires delineating the explananda of synaptic and molecular models, as well as revisiting assumptions about how these mo…
Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive
Philosophers and scientists propose the idea that plants are cognitive, which has been met with criticisms. These criticisms focus on the fact that plants do not possess the properties traditionally associated with cognition. By contrast, several proponents introduce novel ways to conceptualize cognition. How should we make sense of this debate? In this paper, I argue that the plant cognition debate is not about whether plants meet a set of well-…
Rip it up and start again
Contextual framing of loss impacts harm avoidance during risky spatial decisions
Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to…
Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive
Philosophers and scientists propose the idea that plants are cognitive, which has been met with criticisms. These criticisms focus on the fact that plants do not possess the properties traditionally associated with cognition. By contrast, several proponents introduce novel ways to conceptualize cognition. How should we make sense of this debate? In this paper, I argue that the plant cognition debate is not about whether plants meet a set of well-…
What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, Hypotheses, and “Kinding in Progress”
This paper accounts for broad definitions of memory , which extend to paradigmatic memory phenomena, like episodic memory in humans, and phenomena in worms and sea snails. These definitions may seem too broad, suggesting that they extend to phenomena that don’t count as memory or illustrate that memory is not a natural kind. However, these responses fail to consider a definition as a hypothesis . As opposed to construing definitions as expressing…
Where memory resides
Recent proposals that the substrate of memory is molecular raise questions about where this molecular model stands in relation to the dominant synaptic model of memory. In this article, we address the perceived rivalry between these models and ask whether they can be integrated. We argue that addressing rivalry or integration requires delineating the explananda of synaptic and molecular models, as well as revisiting assumptions about how these mo…
On Consistently Assessing Alleged Mnemonic Systems (or, why isn’t Immune Memory “really” Memory?)
How should we assess systems whose mnemonic status is contested? There are, for instance, debates over whether immune memory is “really” memory, or akin to memory as ordinarily attributed to human cognition. In this paper, I challenge two arguments often given by detractors in this debate. The first is that the system does not exhibit errors exemplified in human memory. The second is that it can be described and explained in causal terms alone. I…
When Engrams Become Exograms
The advent of novel technologies has bolstered the idea of extended memory, where memory processes extend beyond the human body or brain. However, investigations of extended memory, and extended cognition more generally, do not address how biological componentry might be externalized from the body and into artifacts. In the paper, I introduce and explore a case where human engrams are externalized into exograms, stored via organic data memory tec…
Psychology (6 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Cognitive science (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Cognition (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Memory and Neural Mechanisms (3 works) · Neuroscience (3 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)