Pablo T Spiller
Biographic Data
| ID | 1003361 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Pablo T Spiller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Pablo T |
| FAMILY NAME | Spiller |
| SIGNATURE | SPILLER P T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 255 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
The impact of consumer advocates on regulatory policy in the electric utility sector
New Institutional Economics
Institutions frame behaviors and exchanges in markets, business networks, communities, and organizations throughout the world. Thanks to the pioneering work of Ronald Coase, Douglas North and Olivier Williamson, institutions are now recognized as being a key factor in explaining differences in performance between industries, nations, and regions. The fast-growing field of new institutional economics analyzes the economics of institutions and orga…
Judicial Lobbying
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislat…
Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making
This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probab…
Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998
Argentina's constitution and electoral rules promote a fragmented polity. It is in those environments that inde- pendent judiciaries develop. Instead, most analysts do not consider the Argentina judiciary as independent. In this article we attempt to explain this contradiction by showing that this perception is inappropriate. We de- velop a test of the hypothesis that the judiciary is independent by empiri- cally examining the political incen- ti…
Amateur Legislators -- Professional Politicians
The Argentine Congress plays a limited role in the production of public policy and is a relatively ineffective check on the Argentine Executive Branch. We argue this is the combined result of incentives created by several features of Argentine political institutions. In this article we emphasize the role of the country's electoral rules, which place the legislator re? election decision not in the hands of the voters, but rather in the hands of th…
El funcionamiento de las instituciones políticas y las políticas públicas en la Argentina
The introduction of direct access in New Zealand's electricity market
The Frontier of Telecommunications Deregulation
Interconnection, equal access, unbundling, and industry structure are four key determinants of facilities-based competition in telecommunications. Using these building blocks, this paper analyzes the differences in telecommunications regulatory regimes in Australia, Chile, Guatemala, and New Zealand, assessing the effect on competition and consumer welfare. Some regulation is necessary as incumbents can prolong their market power after demonopoli…
Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment
The book assesses the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory structures and performance in the telecommunications industry in Jamaica, the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. These core institutions are shown to influence strongly the credibility and effectiveness of regulation, and thus its ability to encourage private investment and support efficiency. Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are…
Congressional Control or Judicial Independence
Extending the approach to congressional and regulatory institutions developed by Shepsle and Weingast, this article introduces an ideologically motivated judiciary. The model yields empirically refutable implications which are then tested in the framework of modelling the Court's decisions on industrial labor relations. Using information on politicians' ADA scores, the composition of the Court, and the decisions of the Court, we obtain estimates …
Arbitrage during the Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard, 1899-1908
A political economy of Uruguay since 1870
Amateur Legislators -- Professional Politicians
The Argentine Congress plays a limited role in the production of public policy and is a relatively ineffective check on the Argentine Executive Branch. We argue this is the combined result of incentives created by several features of Argentine political institutions. In this article we emphasize the role of the country's electoral rules, which place the legislator re? election decision not in the hands of the voters, but rather in the hands of th…
Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998
Argentina's constitution and electoral rules promote a fragmented polity. It is in those environments that inde- pendent judiciaries develop. Instead, most analysts do not consider the Argentina judiciary as independent. In this article we attempt to explain this contradiction by showing that this perception is inappropriate. We de- velop a test of the hypothesis that the judiciary is independent by empiri- cally examining the political incen- ti…
Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making
This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probab…
Judicial Lobbying
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislat…
The Frontier of Telecommunications Deregulation
Interconnection, equal access, unbundling, and industry structure are four key determinants of facilities-based competition in telecommunications. Using these building blocks, this paper analyzes the differences in telecommunications regulatory regimes in Australia, Chile, Guatemala, and New Zealand, assessing the effect on competition and consumer welfare. Some regulation is necessary as incumbents can prolong their market power after demonopoli…
Arbitrage during the Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard, 1899-1908
El funcionamiento de las instituciones políticas y las políticas públicas en la Argentina
The impact of consumer advocates on regulatory policy in the electric utility sector
A political economy of Uruguay since 1870
Arbitrage during the Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard, 1899-1908
Congressional Control or Judicial Independence
Extending the approach to congressional and regulatory institutions developed by Shepsle and Weingast, this article introduces an ideologically motivated judiciary. The model yields empirically refutable implications which are then tested in the framework of modelling the Court's decisions on industrial labor relations. Using information on politicians' ADA scores, the composition of the Court, and the decisions of the Court, we obtain estimates …
Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment
The book assesses the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory structures and performance in the telecommunications industry in Jamaica, the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. These core institutions are shown to influence strongly the credibility and effectiveness of regulation, and thus its ability to encourage private investment and support efficiency. Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are…
The introduction of direct access in New Zealand's electricity market
The Frontier of Telecommunications Deregulation
Interconnection, equal access, unbundling, and industry structure are four key determinants of facilities-based competition in telecommunications. Using these building blocks, this paper analyzes the differences in telecommunications regulatory regimes in Australia, Chile, Guatemala, and New Zealand, assessing the effect on competition and consumer welfare. Some regulation is necessary as incumbents can prolong their market power after demonopoli…
El funcionamiento de las instituciones políticas y las políticas públicas en la Argentina
Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998
Argentina's constitution and electoral rules promote a fragmented polity. It is in those environments that inde- pendent judiciaries develop. Instead, most analysts do not consider the Argentina judiciary as independent. In this article we attempt to explain this contradiction by showing that this perception is inappropriate. We de- velop a test of the hypothesis that the judiciary is independent by empiri- cally examining the political incen- ti…
Amateur Legislators -- Professional Politicians
The Argentine Congress plays a limited role in the production of public policy and is a relatively ineffective check on the Argentine Executive Branch. We argue this is the combined result of incentives created by several features of Argentine political institutions. In this article we emphasize the role of the country's electoral rules, which place the legislator re? election decision not in the hands of the voters, but rather in the hands of th…
Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making
This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probab…
Judicial Lobbying
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislat…
New Institutional Economics
Institutions frame behaviors and exchanges in markets, business networks, communities, and organizations throughout the world. Thanks to the pioneering work of Ronald Coase, Douglas North and Olivier Williamson, institutions are now recognized as being a key factor in explaining differences in performance between industries, nations, and regions. The fast-growing field of new institutional economics analyzes the economics of institutions and orga…
The impact of consumer advocates on regulatory policy in the electric utility sector
Economics (13 works) · Political science (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (5 works) · Engineering (4 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (4 works) · Legislature (4 works)