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Rebecca Stangl

Biographic Data

ID1003501
NAMERebecca Stangl
GIVEN NAMESRebecca
FAMILY NAMEStangl
SIGNATURESTANGL R
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Virginia
ORCID0000-0001-5615-0794
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS7
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX2
  • Virtue and Action: Selected Papers

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2025•References: 3

    Rosalind Hursthouse is a key figure in the twentieth-century revival of virtue ethics. Her On Virtue Ethics was one of the first—and remains one of the best—systematic developments of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics (Hursthouse 1999). But Hursthouse has also written a number of important essays that not only clarify and extend the argument of that book but also take her distinctive approach to ethics into new territory. Julia Annas and Jeremy Reid…

  • Neither Heroes nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation

    Rebecca Stangl•BOOK•Neither Heroes nor Saints•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 12

    Most of us are far from perfect in virtue. Faced with this fact, moral philosophers can respond in two different ways. On the one hand they might insist that the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the other hand, and if they reject such a rigorist …

  • Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•Ethics•2015•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    I develop and defend the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: an action is supererogatory if and only if it is overall virtuous and either (a) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious or (b) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious. I develop this account from within the virtue-ethical tradit…

  • A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2008•Cited by: 3•References: 16

    There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule‐following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implica…

  • Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles

    Open Access•Rebecca Stangl, Rebecca Lynn Stangl•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2006

  • A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2008•Cited by: 3•References: 16

    There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule‐following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implica…

  • Neither Heroes nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation

    Rebecca Stangl•BOOK•Neither Heroes nor Saints•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 12

    Most of us are far from perfect in virtue. Faced with this fact, moral philosophers can respond in two different ways. On the one hand they might insist that the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the other hand, and if they reject such a rigorist …

  • Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•Ethics•2015•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    I develop and defend the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: an action is supererogatory if and only if it is overall virtuous and either (a) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious or (b) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious. I develop this account from within the virtue-ethical tradit…

  • Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles

    Open Access•Rebecca Stangl, Rebecca Lynn Stangl•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2006

  • A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2008•Cited by: 3•References: 16

    There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule‐following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implica…

  • Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•Ethics•2015•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    I develop and defend the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: an action is supererogatory if and only if it is overall virtuous and either (a) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious or (b) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious. I develop this account from within the virtue-ethical tradit…

  • Neither Heroes nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation

    Rebecca Stangl•BOOK•Neither Heroes nor Saints•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 12

    Most of us are far from perfect in virtue. Faced with this fact, moral philosophers can respond in two different ways. On the one hand they might insist that the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the other hand, and if they reject such a rigorist …

  • Virtue and Action: Selected Papers

    Rebecca Stangl•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2025•References: 3

    Rosalind Hursthouse is a key figure in the twentieth-century revival of virtue ethics. Her On Virtue Ethics was one of the first—and remains one of the best—systematic developments of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics (Hursthouse 1999). But Hursthouse has also written a number of important essays that not only clarify and extend the argument of that book but also take her distinctive approach to ethics into new territory. Julia Annas and Jeremy Reid…

Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Ethics in medical practice (4 works) · Virtue (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works)

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