Anders Frederiksen
Biographic Data
| ID | 1006644 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anders Frederiksen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anders |
| FAMILY NAME | Frederiksen |
| SIGNATURE | FREDERIKSEN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4024-9420 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1979 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Working Hours, Top Management Appointments, and Gender
Using Danish registry data linked to the Labor Force Survey, we provide the first rigorous evidence with external validity on the hours-career nexus (positive association between hours and career success). Guided by three theories (human capital; rat race; tournament), we unpack the hours-career nexus through examining: the differential effect of hours in the present firm and elsewhere; hours relative to peers’ hours; standard vs. evening/night/w…
Group-Based Incentives and Individual Performance
Group-based incentives are attractive in contexts where production is interdependent. Prior work shows such incentives increase group performance despite freeriding concerns, yet little is known about the effort response of individuals. Using individual-level data, the authors assess the introduction of group-based performance pay using difference-in-difference estimation. Overall, performance increased by 19%. Nearly all workers contributed to t…
Personnel Practices and Regulation
We study how firms’ personnel practices react to labor market regulation. While a company is compelled to comply with a new law, what is the ripple effect of the change on existing personnel policies and practices? We provide evidence using passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and nearly two decades of administrative data from a large US firm. In line with theory, we find a weakening of long-term implicit incentives and movement to…
Supervisors and Performance Management Systems
We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. Supervisors vary widely in how they rate subordinates of similar quality. In our model, this ratings heterogeneity can arise because supervisors can differ in their ability to manage subordinates or in their leniency when rating subordinates. …
Human Capital and Career Success
Using Danish registry data covering the population of Danish workers, we provide new and robust evidence with external validity on the importance of the breadth of human capital for top management appointments, and support/enrich the human capital theory of corporate leadership by Gibbons and Waldman and Lazear. Our analysis allows for both internal promotion and external recruitment as means to achieve top management appointments, and yields add…
The Increased Importance of Sector Switching
Sector switching is an important phenomenon that casts light on public–private differences. Yet our knowledge about its prevalence and trends is limited. We study sector switching using unique Danish register-based employer–employee data covering more than 25 years. We find that sector switching constitutes 18.5% of all job-to-job mobility, and the trend is increasing both from public to private and from private to public. Sector switching is als…
Chance and Change
Human Capital and Career Success
Using Danish registry data covering the population of Danish workers, we provide new and robust evidence with external validity on the importance of the breadth of human capital for top management appointments, and support/enrich the human capital theory of corporate leadership by Gibbons and Waldman and Lazear. Our analysis allows for both internal promotion and external recruitment as means to achieve top management appointments, and yields add…
The Increased Importance of Sector Switching
Sector switching is an important phenomenon that casts light on public–private differences. Yet our knowledge about its prevalence and trends is limited. We study sector switching using unique Danish register-based employer–employee data covering more than 25 years. We find that sector switching constitutes 18.5% of all job-to-job mobility, and the trend is increasing both from public to private and from private to public. Sector switching is als…
Supervisors and Performance Management Systems
We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. Supervisors vary widely in how they rate subordinates of similar quality. In our model, this ratings heterogeneity can arise because supervisors can differ in their ability to manage subordinates or in their leniency when rating subordinates. …
Chance and Change
The Increased Importance of Sector Switching
Sector switching is an important phenomenon that casts light on public–private differences. Yet our knowledge about its prevalence and trends is limited. We study sector switching using unique Danish register-based employer–employee data covering more than 25 years. We find that sector switching constitutes 18.5% of all job-to-job mobility, and the trend is increasing both from public to private and from private to public. Sector switching is als…
Human Capital and Career Success
Using Danish registry data covering the population of Danish workers, we provide new and robust evidence with external validity on the importance of the breadth of human capital for top management appointments, and support/enrich the human capital theory of corporate leadership by Gibbons and Waldman and Lazear. Our analysis allows for both internal promotion and external recruitment as means to achieve top management appointments, and yields add…
Supervisors and Performance Management Systems
We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. Supervisors vary widely in how they rate subordinates of similar quality. In our model, this ratings heterogeneity can arise because supervisors can differ in their ability to manage subordinates or in their leniency when rating subordinates. …
Personnel Practices and Regulation
We study how firms’ personnel practices react to labor market regulation. While a company is compelled to comply with a new law, what is the ripple effect of the change on existing personnel policies and practices? We provide evidence using passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and nearly two decades of administrative data from a large US firm. In line with theory, we find a weakening of long-term implicit incentives and movement to…
Group-Based Incentives and Individual Performance
Group-based incentives are attractive in contexts where production is interdependent. Prior work shows such incentives increase group performance despite freeriding concerns, yet little is known about the effort response of individuals. Using individual-level data, the authors assess the introduction of group-based performance pay using difference-in-difference estimation. Overall, performance increased by 19%. Nearly all workers contributed to t…
Working Hours, Top Management Appointments, and Gender
Using Danish registry data linked to the Labor Force Survey, we provide the first rigorous evidence with external validity on the hours-career nexus (positive association between hours and career success). Guided by three theories (human capital; rat race; tournament), we unpack the hours-career nexus through examining: the differential effect of hours in the present firm and elsewhere; hours relative to peers’ hours; standard vs. evening/night/w…
Economics (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Labour economics (4 works) · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Demographic economics (2 works) · Economic growth (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Retirement, Disability, and Employment (2 works) · Attendance (1 work)